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Introduction
Translation can be a dangerous act. Though translation may
not be among the first acts that come to mind that elicit strong
responses, translations frequently are among the most central texts
in changing, rupturing, and overturning worldviews. The cover
image of this volume illustrates the extent to which translation can
provoke strong responses: it depicts the preparations to burn the
body of William Tyndale, an early sixteenth-century reformist and
one of the first to translate the Bible into English, an act which led
to Tyndale’s conviction as a heretic and ultimately led to his
execution. Tyndale’s goal in translating the Bible, like the writers
of vernacular theology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
was to make the Word available to all—something taken very
seriously in England after the promulgation in 1409 of Archbishop
Thomas Arundel’s repressive decrees aimed especially at
outlawing vernacular translation or commentary on scriptural texts
without express license from the episcopate. 1
Yet, if for Tyndale translation was a lethal occupation,
more than half a millennium earlier it was used as an expression of
nation-building on the very same soil. Translation was an
important aspect of the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred’s (ruled 871-99)
comprehensive program of reform. One of the earliest extant
English translators, King Alfred allegedly translated Gregory the
Great’s Cura Pastoralis, Boethius’s De Consolatione
Philosophiae, Augustine’s Soliloquiae, and the first 50 Psalms. In
his Preface to Gregory’s Cura Pastoralis, Alfred writes,
“Therefore it seems better to me, if it seems so to you, that we also
should translate certain books which are most necessary for all
men to know into the language that we can all understand…” 2
King Alfred writes that the state of learning had declined so badly
in Anglo-Saxon England that very few could even translate a letter
written in Latin. His educational program, the first of its kind in
1

Cf. Nicholas Watson, “Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval
England: Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel’s
Constitutions of 1409,” Speculum 70 (1995), 822-864.
2
Alfred, “Preface to the Translation of Gregory’s Pastoral Care,” Old and
Middle English c.890-c.1450: An Anthology, Third Ed., ed. Elaine Treharne
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010), 14-15.

the English-speaking world, would help build the English nation
by promoting the vernacular as a useful and dignified medium.
So, translation can be dangerous, political, useful,
community-building—what else? Translation is an art form but
can also be a highly technical philological exercise. If I may, as a
medievalist of Britain and Ireland, be permitted to give one more
Anglophone example (the contributions of this volume will
broaden the geographical reach and theoretical scope), while
Seamus Heaney’s translation of Beowulf won the Whitbread Book
of the Year award, was lauded by literary critics, and revitalized
interest in Beowulf among the general populace, academics and
specialists in Old English bemoaned that Heaney did not do a
sufficient job emulating traditional aspects of Old English verse,
like apposition and style, while also criticizing translation
decisions. Since translating Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology,
Gayatri Spivak has continued to assert that translation is the “most
intimate act of reading.” 3 Translation is personal, it is full of
choices—whether to be literal or simply paraphrase, or whether to
“domesticate” or “foreignize.” Translation is everything all at
once, something we do without realizing it, every time we speak or
listen—a central activity which structures our daily lives.
Given the effect of the twenty-first century’s heightened
globalization, translation is a necessary facet of everything we do.
As a hermeneutical process in understanding elements of a culture
different from one’s own, intellectuals from the ancient to the
modern and the postmodern have addressed the theoretical
practices and practicalities of translation. As such, translation is a
vital exercise for student-scholars. 4 As each translator comes at
his or her work from a unique angle based on the experiences of
his or her life, translation and translation studies provides a vehicle
for student-scholars to contribute unique scholarship to their fields,
while also learning a great deal about their first language and
themselves. This volume addresses many issues of translation—
from papers which explore and practice the “best” methods of
translating to intersemiotic translations of film. The papers of this
volume are collected from two separate conferences, The Third
3

See, for example, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translation as Culture,”
Parallax 6.1 (2000): 13-24, at 20.
4
See Nicholas Kupensky’s paper “Students of the Foreign” in this volume.
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Annual Comparative Humanities Review Conference at Bucknell
University and a conference entitled From a Foreign Point and held
at the Russian State University for the Humanities. Although
separated by many miles, both conferences had similar goals: to
bring together a number of top student-scholars working in the
humanities to comparatively study the importance of translation in
the twenty-first century by turning to the multiple meanings that
the act of translation has had in the past. Each paper investigates
the border spaces between languages, uncovering the crevices
which allow the translation of the “source text” into the “target
text.” The volume as a whole presents the coming together of two
conferences, conferences set in very different locations but which
arrive at very similar conclusions: that translation studies is a
burgeoning field that can teach us a great deal about a wide variety
of disciplines and that student-scholars are very much at home
within its bounds.
The Third Annual Comparative Humanities Review Conference
In her “Translation and Film: Slang, Dialects, Accents and
Multiple Languages,” Allison Rittmayer explores the introduction
of language into film and the resulting nuances associated with this
technological advance. Fundamentally a matter of translation,
Rittmayer surveys the types of multiple language version films and
how each attempts to translate the dialogue, plot, emotions, etc. of
each movie. She then discusses issues in film translation,
including the translation of slang, dialects, accents, and use of
multiple languages within a single film, revealing the difficulties
associated with film translation and offering insights into these
problems.
James Rickard’s “Philosophy, Abstract Thought, and the
Dilemmas of Philosophy” presents the problem of translating the
abstract vocabulary of many philosophical works. By examining
terms like nomos, Epochistik, and Dasein, Rickard explains the
“untranslatable” quality of many key philosophical concepts. In a
further analysis of Nietzsche’s writings, Rickard reveals how
language works in conjunction with Nietzsche’s philosophy, rather
than as a vehicle for meaning. In this circumstance, the translator
must carefully tread the line between faithfulness to content or
form. In this discussion, Rickard asks the question of whether
iii

philosophical translation should be primarily vocabulary based or
include the philosopher’s thought as a whole.
In “The Great War Seen Through the Comparative Lens,”
Steven L. McClellan comparatively reevaluates World War I by
arguing that to fully understand the First World War we must
examine the collective response of the national communities that
fought it. The paper is an exercise in “cultural history,” exploring
multiple processes of signification revolving around the War and
the social identities affected by it. McClellan explores the concept
of Modernity from various perspectives and the connection
between WWI and the “Modern.” He goes on to suggest that the
language of the national community, although supposedly singular
to the specific community, is in reality a universal logic aimed at
totalizing. From this perspective, different translations of
meanings can be uncovered when thinking about the Great War.
Hallie Stebbins’ “A Translation of Lu Xun’s ‘阿 Q 正 传’”
is an exercise in both the theory behind translation studies and a
practical translation. Surveying the different methods of
translating Lu Xun’s work by William Lyell and Xianyi Yang,
Stebbins analyzes the problems in their translation methods while
beginning to enunciate her own theory. In her translation, she
seeks to foreignize rather than domesticate, choosing a passage
from the source text which she did not understand in translation.
Translating this passage herself, she makes the passage clearer
while also encountering the many problems associated with
Chinese translation.
In “Transference and the Ego: A (Psycho)Analysis of
Interpsychic Translation,” Lauren Rutter explores how translation
is a necessary part of ordinary psychological development. By
reading transference as a type of interpsychic translation (from the
drive into language within the self and then again from language of
the self into an outward expression to the analyst), she reveals how
the unconscious is a language to be unraveled. However,
simultaneously, the analyst can mistranslate the analysand’s
unconscious and/or get caught up in counter-transference. This not
only puts the patient at risk, but could become too involved in the
patient.
In Joey McMullen’s “Overstepping Otherness: Christine de
Pizan and Letitia Elizabeth Landon’s Genealogical Retranslations
iv

of Canonized Text,” he explores what he calls “genealogical
retranslation:” how the anxiety of influence forces authors to
retranslate their predecessors in order to move forward and try to
eclipse those of the past. In this paper, he explores how Christine
de Pizan (a medieval French writer) and Letitia Elizabeth Landon
(a Romantic poet) broke the bounds of not only the male canon but
also patriarchal definitions of women and embraced, in the
process, what Kristeva would call “feminine genius.”
From a Foreign Point of View: Student Readings of Russian and
American Culture
In “Do Russians and Americans View Space in the Same
Way?” Evgeny Makarov explores the function of language as
mediator of ideas in terms of conceptual categories of space as
reflected in Russian and English. A distinction is made between
coordinate spatial relations (distance, speed of motion and size,
and mostly processed by the right hemisphere) and categorical
spatial relations (mostly processed by the left hemisphere and
categorized in languages). The paper focuses on categorical spatial
relations, especially preposition use, descriptions of location with
reference to body parts, and specific frames of reference. Makarov
also discusses the importance of cardinal directions and explains
spatial deixis. It is noted that deictic references in English are far
more rigidly defined by the speaker’s position than in Russian. For
Makarov, English does not allow the speaker to shift the deictic
center to any point other than where they are physically located,
whereas Russian tends portray spatial scenes in fine detail.
Kseniya Bychenkova’s “‘May the Forсe Be with You:’”
The ‘Animatistic Minimum’ in the Mythological and Religious
Consciousness,” examines the belief in an omnipresent force
which fills the world and connects all human beings to everything
else in the world. In a broad survey of non-Western cultures,
Bychenkova discusses the different understandings of this force
and many of its anthropological implications. Bychenkova also
linguistically analyzes the many words which come to signify this
impersonal force, mapping the evolution of these words across
diverse cultures. The paper then, after revealing the broader
suggestions of how the concept of “animatistic minimum” can be
used to understand American religion today, reveals how George
v

Lucas translated this age-old spiritual concept in his Star Wars
saga as The Force.
In Mark Winek’s “Radio as a Tool of the State: Radio
Moscow and the Early Cold War,” he examines the role of Radio
Moscow’s broadcasts as a part of Soviet foreign policy from the
end of the Second World War to the 1960s. By looking at the role
of radio broadcasting, he explores a scantily studied, yet influential
battle in the frigid war between Washington and Moscow.
Beginning with the birth of broadcasting in the Soviet Union, he
inspects the evolution of the state broadcasting apparatus up to the
Khrushchev years, when it truly came to be a staple of the Soviet
Union’s international propaganda campaign. By analyzing the
rapid evolution and massive government funding for Radio
Moscow, Winek shows that the service was vital to propagating
Moscow’s foreign policies through its carefully honed message.
In “Tom Stoppard’s The Coast of Utopia in Russia:
Cultural Adaptation,” Clara Leon explores the reception of
Stoppard’s Tony winning trilogy of plays. She argues that
preunderstanding is an important hermeneutic device in
appreciating the trilogy. The translation of understanding then, in
Stoppard’s plays, is highly reliant on the viewer’s/reader’s level of
engagement with the source culture. Her analysis engages with
various Russian perceptions of The Coast of Utopia, giving the
plays a cultural context within her discussion. Further, she
discusses the rift between preunderstanding and actual perception,
noting the translation process which occurs when the play is
viewed or performed.
Nick Kupensky’s “Students of the Foreign” reaffirms the
mission of the Comparative Humanities Review: allowing for the
growth of the Student-Scholar through intellectual discourse and
writing. By reading the differences between Student and Scholar
as paralleling an authoritative meaning found in any text,
Kupensky accepts the plurality of meaning and validates the
research of Student-Scholars. He then asks what it means to be a
Student of the foreign and reveals that for those of us who study
that which is not our own – that which is alien, strange, different,
or, simply, foreign – we are to be constantly reminded that we are
going to be lifelong consumers of the knowledge of the other.
vi

Translation and Film:
Slang, Dialects,
Accents and Multiple
Languages
Allison M. Rittmayer
Bucknell University

The birth of the cinema was initially regarded with great
promise as a universal method of communication. This was
partially true in the era of silent films as there was no need for
translation before the introduction of inter-titles. The images
filmed may have contained distinct cultural markers, thus
rendering them somewhat foreign to spectators outside of the
source culture; however, these markers could be absorbed in the
way a painting is absorbed. Without linguistic intrusion, it was
possible for spectators of foreign films to simply identify
characters in regards to their appearance. This identification could
also be made easier if the spectator knew what culture the film was
coming from, in the way that paintings are understood by virtue of
the culture that produced them. More often than not though, early
silent films portrayed subjects that did not need any cultural
translation. The films of the Lumière Brothers capture events that
cross cultural boundaries—the arrival of a train, children fighting,
factories letting out. It was not until films began to take on
narrative structures and incorporate inter-titles that translation
became an issue.

Still in the silent film era, the introduction of inter-titles,
narration or dialogue presented on a blank screen between
segments of action, brought translation to film in a very basic way.
Most inter-titles were not complex or lengthy in order to
accommodate audiences of varying levels of literacy. This made
translation somewhat easier because there was not as much need to
translate style as is seen in the translation of literature. Aside from
an absence of elaborate style (which was provided by the acting,
rather than the inter-titles), the problems of translating inter-titles
are the same problems seen in translating literature. The translator
had to choose whether to pursue a word for word translation, or a
translation based on the general sense or the inter-titles in their
source language. The fact that inter-titles generally were
descriptive of the actions carried out on screen may have aided
translation because the action could clarify or support any
difficulties found in the source text of the inter-titles.
With the introduction of sound, the universality of film was
largely destroyed. This also provided the impetus for the creation
of national cinemas; directors could now produce films that were
specifically targeted to members of their own language group,
which is a main component of national identity. As such,
characters presented in films could take on distinct identities
through their use of language. Every language has multiple forms,
whether they differ by formality of tone, or regional pronunciation,
or representation of other social characteristics. Suddenly, it
became easy for directors to portray differences in characters by
the way they spoke, rather through exaggerated actions,
expressions, or costumes as in silent films. This also introduced a
subtlety into character development because spectators were no
longer presented with matter-of-fact inter-titles, which acted
somewhat like footnotes to the film, explaining important details
about the characters that could not be portrayed on-screen. This
nuance did not immediately develop, and exaggeration of action
and costume is still an integral part of character development in
some modern-day comedies, however the introduction of sound
eliminated the need for directors and actors to rely on
exaggeration. 1
1

Exaggeration has mainly been replaced by stock characters, which retain
boiled-down elements of exaggerated characters from the early days of cinema.
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In the beginning, sound films did attempt to retain some of
their universality through the production of multiple language
versions. 2 MLVs were made through the process of “double
shooting,” or shooting the same scenes on the same sets but with
different casts and crews representative of the language versions to
be produced. In some cases, multilingual actors were able to be
used, so the same cast would appear in two or three language
versions, as was the case for Jean Renoir’s The Golden Coach,
which was filmed in English, French and Italian. 3 The translation
of the actual scripts may have given the translated films a higher
degree of fidelity to the originals than present day dubbed or
subtitled productions. This increased fidelity would come from
two sources. First, the translation of the script would allow for a
more imitative target text because the translator would not be
worried about making the dubbing match the lips of the actor, nor
would the translator need to try and paraphrase the dialogue or
narration in order to make the subtitles fit on the screen and keep
up with the pace of the action. Additionally, in the cases where
multilingual actors were used, they would have some access to the
source text, as well as the target texts they were trying to produce.
Unlike voice actors reading a script for a dubbing, the multilingual
actors would not need to simply rely on the target text produced by
the translator. The production of such multilingual films seems
very similar to translation by committee to me because the actors
would be aware of discrepancies between the translations and the
source text, and could provide recommendations on the translation
in the same way that actors generally have some input on any
script they work with.
There are two other types of multiple language version
films: remakes and double versions. Remakes are simply instances
where a production company will purchase the rights to a foreign
film and readapting the scenario to fit the target culture. 4 The fact
that this is called “remaking” or “adaptation” implies that there are
varying degrees of fidelity to the original film in such productions.
An example of a remake would be the American movie Three Men
2

Marc Betz, “The Name above the (Sub)Title: Internationalism, Coproduction,
and Polyglot European Art Cinema,” Camera Obscura. 16.1 (2001): 28.
3
Ibid., 28.
4
Ibid., 29.
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and a Baby, 5 a remake of the French comedy Trois homes et un
couffin 6 (trans. Three Men and a Cradle) by Coline Serreau. The
American version of the film makes some minor plot and character
adjustments, but overall appears very similar to the original plot of
the French movie. However, when a bilingual spectator watches
both films, it becomes apparent that the biggest difference between
the two versions is the tone of the film’s humor, and not on the
level of the plot.
The last type of multiple language version film, the double
version, is split into two types. The first version is what spectators
normally think of when they think of a dubbed film; the actors are
all speaking the same foreign language in the original (regardless
of the actor’s nationality), but the voices have been dubbed over in
the target text. The second version is slightly more complicated
and is called either a “Babelonian” or polyglot 7 film. 8 This is
perhaps most popularly seen in “spaghetti westerns” such as The
Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, where the actors come from
different language groups (in this case, English and Italian), and
they recite their dialogue in their native languages during the
filming. The dialogue and narration is then completely dubbed
over into whatever languages a target text is wanted in. In many
cases of Babelonian films, including this practice can be attributed
to the use of non-professional actors who fit the appearance or
nationality demanded of a role, but do not speak the language the
movie is being filmed in.
I have already discussed some of the challenges faced when
translating dialogue and narration in film: synchronizing dubbed
dialogue with the on-screen movement of lips, the spatial
limitations of subtitling, and the need in both dubbing and
subtitling for the translation to keep up with the pace of the on5

Three Men and a Baby. DVD, directed by Leonard Nimoy, 1987, Walt Disney
Video, 2002.
6
Trois homes et un couffin. DVD, directed by Coline Serreau, 1985, Home
Vision Entertainment, 2005.
7
I choose to use the term “Babelonian” because the actors speaking different
languages could not understand each other, and the film is not really speaking
multiple languages like a polyglot since the dialogue is standardized in the
dubbing process. I will discuss what I consider to be a true polyglot film later in
this paper.
8
Betz, “The Name above the (Sub)Title,” 29.
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screen dialogue and action. The other general problem of
translation in film is distraction of the audience. Because
American film produces the largest body of work, American
audiences are underexposed to translated films, as compared with
their European counterparts. In 2004 in Germany, 85 percent of
films shown in theaters were of non-German origin, and of those
films between 70 and 80 percent were from America. 9 This leads
to the European population being more accustomed to seeing
dubbed films or reading subtitles than Americans. Robin Queen
states that “Audiences generally prefer that type of film translation
with which they are most familiar.” 10 Herman Weinberg adds that
“American audiences will not accept dubbed films.” 11
I feel that this rejection of dubbing is mainly apparent in
“serious” films and is a result of the mockery made of dubbed
versions of Asian Kung-Fu and science fiction films where the
dubbed dialogue is often much shorter than the spoken dialogue.
This mockery in turn grew out of what Queen stated — since
general American audiences are most accustomed to seeing movies
filmed in English, they do not prefer any type of film translation,
no matter how well intentioned. Watching a dubbed movie
distracts the spectator from the action of the film because they are
faced with the lack of synchronization between the English
dialogue and the movement of the speaker’s lips. With subtitles,
aside from Americans not wanting to exert the effort to read,
Weinberg quotes Russian director Vsevolod Pudovkin saying that
the concentration and attention required to read subtitles means
that the spectator, “cannot be expected to gain any impression from
the pictorial composition of the original film.” 12 I can attest to
Pudovkin’s assertion in that while attempting to analyze specific
scenes of French films, I have to watch the scenes twice as many
times as I would watch a scene in English. First to fully
understand the dialogue I watch the scene at least four times,
although I do combine the translation of the subtitles with my own
9

Robin Queen, “‘Du hast jar keene Ahnung’: African American English
Dubbed into German,” Journal of Sociolinguistics. 8.4 (2004): 520.
10
Ibid., 520.
11
Herman G. Weinberg, “The Language Barrier,” Hollywood Quarterly. 2.4
(July 1947): 334.
12
Ibid., 336.
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translation of the source dialogue rather than rely on the subtitles
alone. 13 Only after I understand the dialogue can I pay sufficient
attention to the cinematographic techniques used by the director.
I will now present a series of issues in translation that I feel
are particularly important or problematic in the translation of film,
including the translation of slang, dialects, accents, and the use of
multiple languages within a single film. The issue of translating
slang terms is probably the one most common with literary
translation, and it is here that I will begin my discussion.
Translating slang is problematic in more than one way. First, there
is not always an equivalent slang expression in the target language
to what is used in the source text. There may also be more than
one equivalent expression in the target language, which would
force the translator to choose between expressions which might
have slightly different connotations. The biggest problem in
translating slang is censorship — either performed willingly by the
translator, or imposed by some outside body. This censorship can
greatly alter the impact a text has in the target language, especially
if the use of slang is important to character development or plot
development.
In “Translation Effects: How Beauvoir Talks Sex in
English,” Louise von Flotow discussed how Simone de Beauvoir’s
use of explicit sexual terms was censored, reducing the repetition
of specific words within sections of narration, and replacing them
with more euphemistic terms. 14 This same type of censorship can
be seen in film translations. In Romance 15 (1999), directed by
Catherine Breillat, some of the script falls victim to this
censorship. It is particularly notable in this case because Romance
is viewed as one of the most, if not the most, scandalous, sexually
13

If anything, my access to the source language in the case of French films is
further distracting and complicating because I am torn between trying to listen
and understand, but wanting to read the subtitles to make sure I am
understanding correctly. It is even more difficult when I am listening to the
French and come across a word I do not know, but that section of dialogue has
already disappeared from the subtitles.
14
Louise von Flotow, “Translation Effects: How Beauvoir Talks Sex in
English,” Contingent Loves: Simone de Beauvoir and Sexuality, ed. Melanie C.
Hawthorne, (Charlottesville, VA: U Virginia Press, 2000), 13-33.
15
Romance. DVD, directed by Catherine Breillat, 1999, Lions Gate, 2002.
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explicit films produced in France in recent years. The film
follows the sexual discovery of Marie and presents frank
depictions of rape, bondage and sadomasochism, and birth
amongst other things.
One of the most memorable, and more lighthearted scenes,
is also one that succumbs to different levels of censorship in
subtitling and dubbing. Marie is shown making out with, and
being groped by Paolo, the stranger she met at a bar the night
before. They are sitting in Marie’s boyfriend’s car outside their
apartment when Paolo poses the question “Est-ce que tu veux me
faire une pipe?” — “Do you want to give me a blowjob?” Saying
“une pipe” is the most polite way of referring to fellatio in French,
but it is technically a slang term. The term “la fellation” is not
commonly used. The ensuing dialogue has Marie using the term
“une pipe” quite frequently as she explains that she doesn’t want to
give him a blowjob now, but would rather give him a blowjob the
next time they see each other. The English subtitles do a relatively
good job of conveying Marie’s openness in talking about sex, and
consistently use the term “blowjob” as a translation. Perhaps a
slightly more polite choice would have been the expression “go
down on,” but since that can be used to refer to oral sex performed
on either a man or a woman whereas “une pipe” is specifically
male-oriented, the choice of “blowjob” is not a bad one.
The dubbed version of the scene, however, is quite
different. Instead of Paolo asking “Do you want to give me a
blowjob,” the voice actor demands “Blow me, baby.” The effect is
quite hysterical to the American viewer, and this distracts the
spectator from the earnestness of the conversation. For as much as
that makes Paolo’s dialogue more vulgar or masculine (a point to
which I will return later), Marie’s dialogue becomes much more
polite. Instead of using “blowjob,” she simply refers to “blowing”
Paolo, and this only occurs once. In all the other instances where
Marie would have said “une pipe” (there are at least 4), the voice
actress euphemistically refers to “that.” The resulting effect makes
Marie appear much more reserved about sexuality than she is in
the French version. In the case of Romance the distraction caused
by the need to read subtitles is worth it because the dubbed
dialogue is an even greater distraction.
7

As I mentioned, the dubbing of “Est-ce que tu veux me
faire une pipe?” into “Blow me, baby,” does serve to give Paolo’s
dialogue a hyper-masculine quality, something that is lost in the
act of dubbing. The actor intentionally chosen to play Paolo is
Rocco Siffredi, a European porn star who was born in Italy. While
Siffredi is speaking French in Romance, he does speak it with a
distinctly Italian accent. The spectator can still get this effect when
watching Romance with subtitles because they can hear that
Siffredi’s pronunciation is different from that of all the other
characters. When the voice is dubbed over, the accent is lost, and
Paolo is simply given a very deep voice. I think this really changes
the presentation of Paolo as “l’étranger” — both the stranger and
the foreigner, and very much an “Other” to Marie. In the English
dubbed version the dual notion of stranger/foreigner is lost and
Paolo becomes just a man Marie picked up and doesn’t know. The
eroticization of Paolo as the masculine Other could have been
retained by choosing a voice actor with an Italian, or other exotic
accent.
Another obstacle of translation closely associate with the
use of slang is the use of dialects or regional speech. In literature
dialects are often produced in their source language through the
use of non-standard spelling and grammar conventions. In a sense,
this is a first act of translation of an oral form of communication
into a written form, and although a dialect is merely a variation of
a standard language and can be understood when heard, the
transliteration often produces a very foreignizing effect, as is
experience with the use of multiple Southern dialects in The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn by Mark Twain. In literary
translation, a similar effect can be achieved in the target text by
several means. At the very least, if the dialect is not reproduced,
the use of dialect in the original can be footnoted by the translator,
with some of the use of dialect being described in narrative
passages from the original. The translator may also find it possible
to produce a similar effect in the target language through nonstandard spellings or sentence constructions. In translating film,
footnotes obviously cannot be used, and narrative explanations that
could explain the use of dialect cannot easily be incorporated. In
the case of translating with non-standard spellings and grammar,
this is not often done in film because it makes reading subtitles
8

much more difficult, and cannot necessarily be picked up in
dubbing. In some cases however, it is possible to translate from a
source dialect to a target dialect within a source and target
language.
An example of this is found in German translations of
African American Vernacular English (AAVE). Robin Queen
describes that this translation is not performed along racial lines,
but rather focuses on the use of AAVE in urban, working-class
settings, and a connection between the use of AAVE and street
life. 16 The German translations of AAVE incorporate
colloquialisms from across many dialects, mainly Berlinisch,
Jugendsprache, and the more general Umgangsprachen into what
is called the “urban dubbing style.” 17 The combinative nature of
the “urban dubbing style” reflects the fact that in American
reproductions of AAVE and other dialects in film, the most
common characteristics of the dialect are emphasized to the point
of stereotypifying the dialect and its speakers. The fact that this is
very much an “urban dubbing style,” rather than a style
specifically developed for translations of AAVE is illustrated by
the fact that the same principles are used to translate AAVE as
dialogue between other urban, male characters involved in street
life. Queen presents two very complementary examples, the first a
section of dialogue from Boyz N the Hood between three black
men, and a section of dialogue from Jungle Fever between three
Italian American men from the urban working class. The linguistic
characters shared by the German translations of both dialogues
include “a palatal realization of /g/ (jeht’s); pronominal
cliticization (dassde, kannste); final consonant deletion (nich,
gefas); reduction of unstressed syllables (unser rather than unsere);
and informal phrasal and lexical items (flicken).” 18 A similar use
of “urban dubbing” is seen in the German version of Good Will
Hunting, where the main characters come from an urban working
class background in Boston. 19

16

Queen, “‘Du hast jar keene Ahnung,’” 521-522, 524.
Ibid., 521-522.
18
Ibid., 533.
19
Ibid., 533.
17

9

A big challenge to translating film that I have not found
addressed in current scholarship is how to translate what I consider
to be true polyglot films—films where more than one language is
spoken. I will look at the use of both Arabic and French in two
different ways: in isolated scenes in Chaos 20 (2001) directed by
Coline Serreau, and integrated with French dialogue in Inch’Allah
Dimanche 21 (2001) directed by Yamina Benguigui. In both cases,
the challenge for translation is how to translate the language that
would already be foreign and subtitled in the original French films.
In Chaos the act of translating is made somewhat easier
because the scene where Arabic is spoken is separated from the
rest of the action of the story because it is a flashback. The
flashback features narration in French of Malika’s childhood as an
immigrant from Algeria, but also includes dialogue in Arabic
between Malika’s father and the man he wants to marry her to.
The effect of the use of Arabic on the French audience is reflected
in Malika’s confusion over the man’s visit and her initial
incomprehension of the situation. Some of this feeling of
incomprehension is lost on American audiences because there is no
difference between the subtitled French and the subtitled Arabic.
A spectator must be actively listening while reading in order to
sense the difference in languages. With dubbing it is even worse
because everything is dubbed into English, with no sense of
foreignness inherent in the visitor.
In Inch’Allah Dimanche the situation is somewhat
different. The use of both French and Arabic occurs throughout
the film, and access to language is very important to the action.
The story is a family drama, focused again on immigrants from
Algeria, although Inch’Allah Dimanche is set around 1976, much
earlier than Chaos. Zouina comes to live with her husband Ahmed
in France as part of the regroupement familial which allowed
Algerian men working in France on permits to bring their families
to live with them. Zouina brings with her two sons and one
daughter, all of school age, and her mother-in-law, Aïcha. Aïcha is
a very traditional Algerian, Muslim woman, and she only speaks a
limited amount of French. As she plays a major role in the story,
20
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there is necessarily an intermingling of languages. Zouina speaks
both Arabic and French, as do Ahmed and their children, although
the children are only seen speaking in French. In a pivotal scene in
the film, Aïcha scolds Zouina in Arabic for letting the children
draw rather than practice writing. The eldest son asks her why she
is so mean (méchante) to their mother, and Aïcha replies asking,
“Méchante? Qu’est que c’est méchant? Je ne sais pas qu’est-ce
que ça veut dire.” The son gives her the Arabic equivalent and she
dismisses his accusation. Aïcha then tells him that he will now be
responsible for teaching his father how to write and read French.
It is very clear that the multilingual nature of this household
is central in this scene, however, the complexities are lost in the
English subtitles to a spectator who does not know Arabic, or
cannot differentiate it from the French in the rapid, and rapidly
alternating dialogue. I cannot think of a way to convey this
complexity through subtitling in any way other than introducing
the subtitle as in Arabic (which would get tedious because of its
frequent use in the film), or some other system of identification,
such as color-coding the languages. I would be most likely to
recommend a sort of hybrid film translation. Well done dubbing
would give the possibility of retaining the foreignness and
multiplicity. The French dialogue could be translated into English,
while the Arabic was left un-dubbed, and translated through
subtitles — delivered to American audiences in the same way
French audiences would encounter it.
While there are many similarities between literary
translation and film translation, these occur at a very basic level.
Translating film becomes very complicated because of the need to
make sure the translated dialogue and narration, in subtitles or
dubbing, is somewhat synchronized with the movements of the
speakers lips, gestures, and other actions portrayed on the screen.
These contribute to the problems of translating dialects and
multiple languages because there is only so much space for
subtitling, and dubbing must be done in a manner that is
understandable, yet distinguishable. Many of these challenges
arise from the fact that, except in the case of remakes and
adaptations, film translations are only half-translations. The source
text remains half intact in the images projected on screen. This is
what makes it so hard for film translations to be effective. The
11

source text is always present, reminding the spectator that they
are hearing or reading a translation. This is tantamount to an actor
crossing the cinematic “fourth wall” by directly looking at and
addressing the audience, thus reminding them that they are
watching a film, and not experiencing a reality.
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Philosophy, Abstract
Thought, and the
Dilemmas of
Philosophy
James Rickard
Bucknell University

When considering the relation between languages, it seems
intuitive that there are common references reflecting simple
empirical observations. One would not expect there to be any
great difficulty in translating terms such as “tree” or “chair;” what
difficulties arise, however, as translation moves away from these
basic referential terms? Willard Quine writes in “Meaning and
Translation” that “Empirical meaning is what the sentences of one
language and their firm translations in another language have in
common.” 1 Quine argues that linguistic meaning is purely
referential and is derived from the symbolism of a term. He uses
radical translation—a theoretical situation of creating correlations
between a familiar language and one completely alien (which he
calls the “jungle” language)—to draw his point, claiming that
“What we objectively have is just an evolving adjustment to
nature, reflected in an evolving set of dispositions to be prompted
by stimulations to assent to or dissent from occasion sentences.” 2
This view of language is one which begins with common
references such as basic objects of perception, and then builds
more complex terms, phrases, and combinations of meanings to
1
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express more conceptual notions. The conceptual grid of
language as a whole is then that of empirical perception—any
abstraction is the combination of these more basic terms, and no
inter-lingual equivalence would be guaranteed between
abstractions, even assuming that the basic terms have a degree of
equivalence.
Quine states that “…the analogies [or, correlations] weaken
as we move out toward the theoretical sentences, farthest from
observation. Thus who would undertake to translate “Neutrinos
lack mass” into the jungle language? If anyone does, we may
expect him to coin new native words or distort the usage of old
ones.” 3 This claim seems true, regardless of whether we accept his
argument of the empirical nature of inter-lingual relations and of a
minimal conceptual grid—sense and consideration show how
difficult translation and understanding become as we move from
concrete terms towards those more abstract. For example, the
phrase “Rabbits have weight” naturally shows itself to be easier to
translate than “Neutrinos lack mass” due to the former’s basic
nature of linguistic meaning and the abstract, complex correlations
of meaning contained in the latter phrase.
What implications does this difficulty of translating
abstract language hold in regards to practical matters, outside of
the realm of Quine’s experiment of radical translation?
Considering philosophy as a study typically involving abstract
terms and concepts, we are then faced with an interesting and
extremely significant difficulty of translating philosophical works.
Conveyance of meaning through translation is obviously a crucial
aim for any work that is translated—with this concern of the
translatability of abstract terminology, however, philosophy seems
to have an added element of difficulty. As a field which relies on
an array of abstract vocabulary, how do we translate a work and
still remain faithful to both the thinker and the source language
(SL)? By translating key terms do we risk disturbing the very
essence or meaning of a work, and by transplanting an author’s
thought do we risk changing the very message itself? Our goal is
to examine this problem—it will be seen that this is a very real
risk, and that complete equivalence cannot always be expected,
3
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and that in some cases the author’s very ideas can be endangered
by translation and interpretation.
The first example is the ancient Greek term nomos.
Richard Kraut tells how “the Greek term that is translated as
‘law’—nomos—covers not only the enactments of a lawgiver or
legislature, but also the customs, norms, and unwritten rules of a
community.” 4 Our contemporary concept of law lacks the same
meaning as that of the Greek culture. We consider law as existing
beyond societal norms: as Kraut points out, we may say “that
slavery is contrary to the moral law, and that this law existed
before the wrongness of slavery began to receive general
recognition.” On the contrary, nomos necessarily includes the
sociological background of a community and its legal system.
There is a cultural discrepancy, and therefore a potential loss of
meaning, between the term nomos and the English word “law” into
which it is typically translated. 5
In his article titled “The Problem of Translating” Hans
W.L. Freudenthal discusses this problem of equivalence in
translation. Words are not isolated terms with static meanings—he
claims that “Each word has been coined in a specific atmosphere, it
has its own history; the metamorphoses of meaning throughout
time often demonstrate this fact [dynamic, mutable nature of
terms] with a distinctness baffling to linguists.” 6 He brings up an
example from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil,
discussing Helen Zimmern’s translation of de Epochistik as
“science of epochs”:
The phrase “science of epochs” makes no sense at all, and
the context suggests a very different meaning. It is obvious
that the word Epochistik will not be found in any
dictionary. The translation of Nietzsche’s works
presupposes a study of the peculiarities of his brilliant style
and acquaintance with the fact that his procedure was
willfully creative in the matter of the coinage of words.
4
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But more than this: one has to be well informed
concerning the things constantly present to this
philosopher’s inner eye and which provide him continually
with the images, analogies and similarities that he
explores. 7
In this case we see the problem that Quine discussed in
approaching abstract translation—Epochistik is a term which lacks
one-to-one equivalence or any easy correlation that does not
involve significant footnoting or drawn out language. Interestingly
enough, in this case even those solutions would seemingly fall
short, as footnoting and extenuated, lengthy explanations are by no
means Nietzsche’s style, and would risk changing the very nature
of his thought—this, however, is an issue which we will briefly
delay.
Does this difficulty and potential untranslatability of
Epochistik then damage the meaning that Nietzsche intended? If
“science of epochs” is not an accurate translation, then some of the
value or meaning is definitely lost—the question then is if this
difficulty is significant in whether or not it hinders the conveyance
of meaning. Another example may be seen in translations of The
Genealogy of Morals. An extremely important aspect of this text
is the separation between the terms das Böseste and das Schlechte.
For Nietzsche, the separation between these words, translated by
Walter Kaufmann as “evil” and “bad” respectively, is immensely
important to the entire discussion of the “slave” and “nobility,” and
the very antithesis drawn between these opposite concepts hinge
around understanding a clear division between the two. In his
introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra Kaufmann discusses
difficulties with the translation by Thomas Common, writing that
Common “coins ‘baddest’ in a passage in which Nietzsche says
‘most evil’” 8 in The Genealogy of Morals. Thomas Common’s
apparent failure to draw an oppositional difference between “Good
and Bad” and “Good and Evil” by mistranslating das Böseste
greatly damages Nietzsche’s entire project and demonstrates
significant loss of meaning stemming from the same basic
7
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problems seen in the difficulty of understanding what Freudenthal
considered “the philosopher’s inner eye.”
In putting trust into translations, one would hope that it
would portray the most accurate equivocation possible and would
not contain gross mistranslations such as Common’s coinage of
“baddest.” Nonetheless, even in an ideal translation, the problem
discussed above is very real and it is understood that translation
lies in finding a compromise between the source text and the target
language. In response to this worry, some translators have chosen
to leave certain crucial terms untranslated and not risk replacing
them with a word from the target language which may be loaded
with a meaning that varies from the source term. One example of
this is the English translations of Heidegger and the term Dasein.
In a version of Being and Time translated by John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson, this word is left untranslated and explained in
its first instance by a footnote. They tell how “the word ‘Dasein’
plays so important a role in this work and is already so familiar to
the English-speaking reader who has read about Heidegger, that it
seems simpler to leave it untranslated except in the relatively rare
passages…” 9 This practice of not translating terms then tries to
avoid this problem of finding a word in the TL that signifies a
closely accurate meaning for a crucial and difficult word in the SL.
By leaving the original word untranslated, which can be seen as in
a sense coining a new word in the TL, the translator then decides to
explain the meaning outside of the original author’s thought itself,
using mechanisms such as footnotes—through this the term may
be expanded and explained more proficiently and still be kept in a
similar context as the original work.
Footnoting and other methods of avoiding the problem of
untranslatability seem to be closely related to what Jonathan Cohen
had in mind when he claims in “Are Philosophical Theses Relative
to Language?” that “this is what constitutes a fundamental
difference between philosophy and grammar—when philosophical
theses mention an expression there is nothing to prevent that
expression’s being translated along with the rest of the thesis. You
can find, for instance, books about the rules of Aristotelian logic
written in many different natural languages and all using the same
9
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example for a syllogism…” 10 Cohen’s statement is in the context
of an argument between the translatability of grammatical and
philosophical theses, and while this may be seemingly off-topic,
his claim is one which is important and shows both truth and
falsity. Cohen uses the universal syllogism “all men are mortal” to
support this assertion of the translatability of philosophical theses,
and his claim in this specific instance does seem to be true. This
example, however, is a very basic instance of “philosophical”
thought—neither the terms nor the overall proposition portray
much of a degree of abstraction. The thesis “All men are mortal”
is undoubtedly less complex of a claim than a statement such as
“True moral action follows the categorical imperative.” This is no
attempt to make an overall comparison between the translatability
of Aristotle and Kant, but rather to show a flaw in Cohen’s
argument. Granted, philosophical terms and theses may be
translated with different degrees of equivalence, as a simpler
proposition such as Cohen’s example seems to lend itself to
translation rather easily while the latter example would be much
more difficult. Nonetheless, his argument seems to fall short of
any serious critique of the examples given previously—in many
instances translation deals with concepts of abstraction which are
loaded with cultural and linguistic meaning that are both
inseparable (at least to some degree) from the SL and alien to the
TL. Furthermore, Cohen’s argument also necessarily considers
philosophical concepts distinctly separate from grammar and
language itself. What happens when philosophy is not separate
from the use of language?
An example of this problem may be seen in poetry. When
translating poetry do we concern ourselves primarily with retaining
the meaning of the words and sacrifice the sense and feeling of the
work? Or, instead, do we retain the latter and risk damage to the
meaning, which may be lost from poorer word choices? Either
way, the translator risks damage to the original instance of art. The
previous examples of philosophical terms in translation
demonstrate that we cannot always expect a one-to-one
equivalence when moving into another language, and instead must
use devices such as footnoting or expanding a thought into a longer
10
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sequence of terms or phrases. In many instances it could be
argued that this does not damage the meaning of a philosophical
thesis or of an abstract concept, such as the argument expressed by
Cohen. What if, however, philosophy held similar aspects as those
of poetry and we could not separate grammar, syntax, and meaning
so easily?
In many cases this seems to be a rather absurd question.
Philosophy, in numerous respects, does seem to be separate from
the sense of language in the overall work—metaphysics, for
example, is typically a study in which language serves to logically
connect philosophical terms. In this sense, while the terms may
face difficulties of translation, the translator would most likely
favor the equivalence of terms over the style of the SL. But not all
philosophy is formatted or stylized as metaphysical discourse, not
all authors use language for the same purposes, and the notion that
philosophy could use language and feeling in the same way as
poetry is quite important to the way in which we consider its
translation.
Nietzsche’s work serves as an excellent example for this
consideration. Unlike metaphysics and similar philosophy,
Nietzsche sought after a very different project. It is not a project
which, like generations of thinkers before, sought to define lofty
eternals or definite absolutes. Nietzsche’s philosophy is that which
is seen in his works such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The
Antichrist—his project is that of the “revaluation of values,” of the
pursuit of perspectives. Sarah Kofman discusses this very nature
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, writing that
Tyranny is reprehensible in all its forms, including that of
any philosopher seeking to raise his spontaneous evaluation
to the status of an absolute value and his style to that of a
philosophical style ‘in itself’, opposed to poetic style ‘in
itself’ like truth opposed to untruth, good to evil… Whether
writing is conceptual or metaphorical (and since Nietzsche
the opposition has hardly applied any longer), the essential
thing is… to be at enough of a distance from it to make fun
of it. 11
11
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The typical philosophical style—what Kofman argues as the style
of the “metaphysician”—is that of transcending both meaning and
language to absolutes, to logical propositions which are universal,
or as close to universal as possible. This is not Nietzsche, and his
language mirrors his philosophy. Similar to poetry, language does
not serve merely as a vehicle for Nietzsche’s meaning, but rather it
works in conjunction with his philosophy. His language and his
thought are not separate—together, they are his meaning. To quote
Walter Kaufmann, who seems to understand this very same point:
…it is impossible to be faithful to the content while
sacrificing the form: meaning and mood are inseparable. If
the translator makes things easy for himself and omits a
play on words, he unwittingly makes a lighthearted pun or
rhyme look serious, if he does not reduce the whole
passage to nonsense. 12
For Nietzsche this mutual connection is that of his use of
metaphor—by creating this reflection between meaning and sense,
between his thought and the very use of his language, he brings
about the revaluation that his philosophy itself cries out for. By
the use of metaphor and poetic style he creates the ability for a
plurality of perspectives and the capacity for his text to evolve. As
our concepts of “truth” change, so must our perspective, our
thought, and therefore, also our style.
How do we translate this plurality of style and meaning in a
work in which they are inseparable? One reason for Kaufmann’s
retranslations was that,
For one thing, they completely misrepresent the mood of
the original—beginning, but unfortunately not ending, with
their many unjustified archaisms, their ‘thou’ and ‘ye’ with
the clumsy attendant verb forms, and their whole
misguided effort to approximate the King James Bible…
More often than not, he [Thomas Common] either
12
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overlooks a play on words or misunderstands it, an in both
cases makes nonsense of Nietzsche. 13
In this criticism then we see a failure to convey this style and the
subsequent loss of meaning, the very loss that, “abets the common
misconception of the austere Nietzsche, when, in fact, no other
philosopher knew better how to laugh at himself.” 14 That is one
way, then, which it seems we should not translate Nietzsche—
criticism of previous faults may help us, but how do we retain the
very style which Common seemed to betray?
Kaufmann explains his attempt at a better translation,
writing that “an effort has been made to preserve as much as
possible of his cadences, even where they are awkwardly groping
or overstrained. What is thus lost in smoothness is gained for the
understanding of the development of his style and personality.” 15
Here, foreignizing is preferable to domesticating Nietzsche’s
language and Kaufmann surely shows this with his criticism of
Common’s translation and his own preference for “style and
personality” over smoothness. Kaufmann’s decision is correct if
Nietzsche’s style and meaning are inseparable—why risk
sacrificing both the beauty and innate meaning of writing for a
higher degree of ease or smoothness?
The pursuit of this brief talk, however, is not to define
methods by which translations can become flawless, nor should it
be seen as an attempt, or at least much of one, to recommend better
devices or practices for the translator. We have seen how cultural
and inter-lingual differences hinder the translation of abstract
terms—Quine’s claim that “…continuities [between languages], by
facilitating translation, encourage an illusion of subject matter…” 16
in this case seems to be true. That is not to say abstract terms
cannot be translated, but instead that we must realize the existence
of conceptual differences between languages and beware of
assuming that a term from the SL holds the very same connotations
and correlations as the word that we perceive to generate it in the
TL. Furthermore, we must also be aware that translation of
13
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philosophy and of conceptual thought in general cannot be
viewed as the translation primarily of vocabulary, but also of the
translation of thought as a whole. With the connection between
style and meaning which was seen in Nietzsche, we must realize
that to translate is to interpret and that by disregarding or
privileging any particular aspect we risk damage to the work,
especially when there is such a dependence on language.
This difficulty of translation is, at least in part, a reflection
of Nietzsche’s various interpretations and ideas which, through the
metaphor, show (or, perhaps only encourage) multiplicity and
change as the only permanency. Kaufmann’s criticisms of
Common in many respects do seem to ring true, as being unable to
see Nietzsche’s humor within his seriousness, his carefulness
within his rashness—in short, this very plurality of perspectives—
would doubtlessly damage the translation of Nietzsche’s language
and his philosophy. At the same time, however, if as Sarah
Kofman wrote, “A new reading/writing destroys the traditional
categories of the book as a closed totality containing a definitive
meaning, the author’s; in such a way it deconstructs the idea of the
author as a master of the meaning of the work …”, then maybe we
may wish to seek particular meaning from the ambiguity and
multiplicity, from the very “pluralism of interpretations and their
renewal.” 17 Perhaps we cannot completely discard any translation,
and instead consider different interpretations in translation and if
perhaps, as Walter Benjamin wrote, “all great texts contain their
potential translation between the lines…” 18
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The Great War
Seen Through the
Comparative Lens
Steven L. McClellan
The Pennsylvania State University
Why Comparative History? A Unity of Difference
So much has been published on the First World War that it
might be more worthwhile to ask, why the Great War again? A
new call for a reevaluation the war seems to be most trifling, and
probably met with an occasional yawn: surely someone has
developed an adequate interpretation by now. However, recent
efforts by numerous historians in Europe, such as Jay M. Winter,
Annette Becker, and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, have shown that
this assertion would be quite wrong. Since the end of the war in
1918, there have been numerous historical paradigms, each
focusing on different “configurations” that were believed to be
important in remembering the war. The aim here is to argue that to
fully understand the First World War we must examine the
collective response of the national communities that fought it.
Naturally, as the war dragged on, and as the cost in life and
material rose, the representations of the national communities
changed to adapt to the situation of the times. It can even be said
that this is the beginning of the change of the nationalist narrative
from the cultural to the political: after all, words such as “threat”,
“security”, and “sacred” all belong to the conservative political
camp. The origins of totalitarianism, whether fascist, Nazi, or
communist, can be directly traced back to the Great War and the

development of the integrated national community. There is
something to be said of Martin Heidegger’s concern about the
totalizing and enframing processes that occur in the twentieth
century, although he would find different sources for this.
Whatever the origin, the fact is that since the beginning of the
Modern Age, the issues of identity, both for the individual, and for
his connection to society, has been of primary concern. It is
therefore essential to examine the cultural modes of representation
used by the peoples of the past which they used to aid in making
sense of their own world, and not to merely trace the notions of
“progression”, whether if it is a supposed progression of
technology, political systems, economics, or liberty. Henri Bergson
was correct that time is duration. However, in order to come to
express the actions, feelings, ideas, and emotions of our
predecessors, we must examine it one expression at a time, and
hopefully, just hopefully, a larger picture will become clear.
In a sense, this paper is an exercise in cultural history, in
which it examines what Jay Winter calls “representations.” To
Winter this is merely a part of the shifting paradigm in First World
War studies, corresponding to the third historiographical
configuration: cultural history. 1 To Winter, “cultural history is a
history of the intimate…It is a history of signifying practices; it
studies how men and women make sense of the world in which
they live.” 2 These signifiers can be found in the many ways that
collective national communities represented their world through
art, literature, media, music, toys, games, monuments, etc. What
makes the First World War so important in the terms of the
national community is how the populations that made up these
communities responded to the war and the sacrifices made during
it: “Social identities are legitimized through commemoration. Here
is one of the major characteristics of contemporary cultural life:
identity is value.” 3 However, the historian must be cautious so as
not to overstep these cultural signifiers, for the war itself may be
given too much precedence and itself reified. In his own
1
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argument, Winter maintains that the shift to cultural history was
made in response to the fall of the Marxist paradigm, where
histories today do not make sense because of their objectivity, “but
precisely [because of] their subjectivity, and the question of how
representative are they is now deemed meaningless.” 4 The search
is not for all-encompassing histories that provide universal
explanations; rather it is for a history of everyday life, what the
Germans call the Alltagsgeschichte. The study of the
representations that national communities used to define their
world during specific points in history is called “mentalités.” It is
what Winter has called “the mental furniture of populations” in the
past: “Mentalité in this discourse means visceral commitments
rather than ideologies, unspoken assumptions rather than political
or social programs.” 5 With the decline of historical materialism,
the turn is made towards the ideas and representations that make
up the human condition. For all intents and purposes, this is the
era of a new historical idealism.
This shift to cultural history has been closely aligned with
the First World War, and with warfare in general. Stéphane
Audoin-Rouzeau coined the term “war culture” (culture de guerre)
alluding to the conceptual mental framework men and women
draw on to make sense of their world at war. In a series of studies
on childhood, war atrocities, and mourning practices, AudoinRouzeau showed the way this war culture seeped into every area of
domestic life. 6 He goes so far to argue that war strips man down to
his barest essentials, allowing the historian to see visibly his ideas
and beliefs:
The violence specific to warfare is a prism that
refracts many otherwise invisible aspects of the
world. Entire societies can be seen anew, but one
must be willing to look closely. In paroxysms of
4
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violence everything is stripped naked - starting with men,
their bodies, their fantasies and desires, their fears,
passions, beliefs hatreds…the motivations that
allow them to kill their fellow men and endure the
terror of confrontation - these pertain to something
essential - something we shall call their
‘representations’. 7
Audoin-Rouzeau falls in line with the work of British military
historian John Keegan, in challenging the Clausewitzian notion
that “war is politics by other means”, both stating a deep truth: war
is first and foremost a cultural act. 8 However, the inseparable
character of the nation and the people brings merit to this argument
that war is the creation and unification of culture by other means
against external “enemies.” After all, had Clausewitz not also said
“The passions which break forth in war must already have a latent
existence in the peoples”? 9
The Discourses of the National Community
In an essay entitled, “Of Men and Myths: The Use and
Abuse of History and the Great War,” Holger H. Herwig examines
five case studies in which myths about historical events were
created, and elaborated upon. 10 Herwig uses the term myth, not “in
Joseph Campbell’s sense, whereby myths are designed to teach us
how to search for meaning, to seek the essence of being alive, and
to feel the spiritual potentialities of life,” but in the “classic Greek
sense, in which the myth, for all its inconsistencies and absurdities,
when accepted as truth, represents the learning and wisdom of a
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society.” 11 Myths are an essential part of modern political culture.
They constitute that web of shared meaning by which the members
of a complex society form and sustain their association, providing
the unity as something natural, self-evident. 12 The narration of
these myths becomes important, for the names that are given to the
objects in the narration, as well as those who are either telling the
story or those who the story is being told to, creates identities, and
the narrative myth becomes a part of identity. Names therefore are
important in the telling of a story, in that, as Jean-François Lyotard
has pointed out: “Names - define a world, a world of names - the
cultural world. This world is finite because in it the number of
available names is finite.” 13 These stories of narration fill the gaps
between these names, and in the case of a myth, according to
Herwig’s usage, they are placed in the particular gaps of a story
that are unique to the experience of a society.
To expand on Herwig’s example, the historian at times
provides a helping hand in creating and developing narratives that
can be taken as either/or truth and identity creation. This is
particularly so when the historian belongs to a specific community
that has for a long time accepted a myth as an integral part of
national identity. Indeed, after Hayden White and the linguistic
turn, and after Alain Corbin and Roger Chartier and the history of
representations, it is impossible to even take eye-witness accounts
at their face value without raising questions as to how they were
formulated, constructed, and prefigured by their author’s views.
Ernest Gellner states that “Nationalism is not the awakening of
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not
exist.” 14 However, there must be a distinction made: Gellner
supposes that all nationalism masquerades as a falsity, and does
not consider its creation. Benedict Anderson places his emphasis
on the “imagining” of the national community, in which it is
imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will
11
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never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion.” 15 More importantly in terms of the narration, as
Anderson points out, is that “communities are to be
distinguished…by the style in which they are imagined.” 16 This
places the emphasis of study on the narrative itself, as it is the
acceptance of the narrative as truth that becomes part of the
creation of identity.
It is again Jay Winter who points out two kinds of narrative
discourses that were in use in Europe during, and before the First
World War. The historical tradition, influenced by Paul Fussell’s
The Great War and Modern Memory, which focused primarily on
the British war poets, argued that the war had swept away a set of
literary conventions and gave us a new and deeply ironic voice.
This was a point in human history where mankind attacked the
abstract notions that had been followed blindly: it was the break of
tradition, and the creation of the Modern. As Fussell writes: “the
Great War was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking place
within a seamless, purposeful ‘history’ involving a coherent stream
of time running from past through present to future…the Great
War took place in what was, compared with ours, a static world,
where the values appeared stable and where the meanings of
abstractions seemed permanent and reliable.” 17 The argument that
the Great War represented a break in history, and discontinuity
with the past and with the Modern has been well commented on.
Kenneth Silver’s Esprit de Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avantgarde and the First World War writes that after 1914, “selfcontrol, self-abnegation, and self-denial of so many kinds became
a national modus vivendi” and that this mood dominated the visual
arts as it did the rest of social life. It was only after the war had
ended that artists could again begin to “invent the world” without
the shackles of war-related constraints. 18 Thus, the war was for
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Silver, a step backwards: modernity was regressive not
progressive. Modris Eksteins presents us with another view of
Modernism in his Rites of Spring: the Great War and the Birth of
the Modern Age. Speaking from a distinctly German perspective
(although Eksteins deals with Britain and France, the main drive of
the argument is clear), the author echoes the birth of Modernity as
a creation born of chaos, quoting Elias Canetti: “the banging of
windows, and the crashing of glass are the robust sounds of fresh
life, the cries of something new-born.” 19 Eksteins’ argument
follows that the questioning of traditional values, indeed the
Nietzschean “transvaluation of values” of violence, power,
aggression, that denote Nazi culture can be traced back to the war
enthusiasm felt by Germans in August 1914. This is the reason
why Eksteins sees profound links between facets of Stravinsky’s
“Rite of Spring,” the theatricality of the Great War, and the
primitive choreography of Nazi “culture.”
In response, Jay Winter argues in Sites of Memory, Sites of
Mourning—based on the “collective remembrance” of the Great
War—Modernity was not solely the only form used to make sense
of the time. For Winter, “Modernism was a cultural phenomenon,”
for sure, but at the same time “a set of what may be called
‘traditional values’—classical, romantic, or religious images and
ideas widely disseminated in both elite and popular culture before
and during the war,” remained. 20 For Winter, the war did not
represent a clear break from the Modern and the traditional, as both
“forms of imagining the war were evident long before the
armistice. Furthermore, the distinction was at times more
rhetorical than real. Modernists didn’t obliterate traditions; they
stretched, explored, and reconfigured them in ways that alarmed
conventional artists, writers, and the public at large.” 21 Winter
notes quite correctly that Modernism follows its own teleology,
that is always dependent on the past:
‘Modernism’ - more of a temperament than a set of
19
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fixed beliefs - left behind as neatly and surgically as some
scholars suggest a host of images and conventions
derived from eighteenth and nineteenth-century
religious, romantic, or classical traditions…it is the
very teleology of this position - the search for
precursors or exponents of what later critics have
admired or rejected - which makes the ‘modernist’
hypothesis about the cultural history of the early
twentieth century just as misleading as other
tendentious interpretations of recent or not so recent
history. 22
It is interesting here to compare Winter’s work with Anderson’s
conception of the temporal trappings of nationalism. For
Anderson, the narrative of nationalism follows a conception of
simultaneity, in which time, is “an idea of homogeneous, emptytime, in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time,
marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal
coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.” 23 The age of
nationalism is represented by the connection of past and future,
which is what gives a national community its distinct identity, and
culture. This is not merely a “Modern” mode of interpretation and
criticism, but one that was in play ever since historical
consciousness was awaken in Europe at least by the fifteenthcentury; after all the dialectic of ancients and moderns in history
dated as far back as Machiavelli. 24
The Great War was a culmination of the traditional modes
of cultural representations coupled with the discourses of the
Modern being played out on the battlefield. Although there had
been wars between nation-states in Europe before, the First World
War marked the first conflict that encompassed the whole of every
national community involved. Even the neutral nations, as far
away as the United States, would not be left untouched. There is no
discontinuity in the twentieth century between the traditional and
the Modern, surely the romantic images of war were lost by 1918,
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especially once the war poets and novelists got their hands on
them, but the men and women of the generation of 1914, the
masses that made up the armies and workers, went to war that year
based on the ideas and representations that composed their national
identities - the war for all belligerent nations was justified by
defense of the common, collective identity. However the Great
War was such a traumatic event, it left many aloft and devoid of
meaning. The huge excesses in killing and destruction, even after
the war, made people feel at the time that the war did offer a break
with the past. After all, how could Europe go back to the way
things were after such a catastrophe? And although has Jay Winter
as pointed out, “Auschwitz was not Verdun”, it still must be
remembered that the “lost generation” of 1914 were executioners
as well as victims. 25
The Nation at War: Singularity and Universality
Most historians would maintain that the nationalist
narrative began in France. The Great Revolution had created both
internal and external concerns, which made it necessary for the
numerous revolutionary governments to promote the idea of not
only the nation, but also of the “Republic” in order to maintain
what had been gained. There were of course movements against
this: one can only think of the slaughter of the Vendée, and the
alienation of the clergy. However, for the most part, the nationalist
zeal that overtook France and Europe was quite successful. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen declared: “The
principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No
body, no individual can exercise authority that does not expressly
emanate from it” (article 3). The nation was to be the collective
representation of “the general will” that Rousseau had argued
should be the basis of political government. As for Rousseau:
“What causes human misery is the contradiction…between nature
and social institutions, between man and citizen…Give him over
entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself, but if you
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divide his heart you destroy him.” 26 In this sense, as a Republic,
France had chosen to be a nation of citizens, one of civilization,
not of barbarism.
The problems that this causes, argues Tzvetan Todorov is
that “Legitimation via the nation instead of God has been viewed
as inseparable from preference for one’s own country at the
expense of universal principles, membership in a culture - which is
undeniable and unavoidable - has come to justify the requirement
that cultural and political entities should coincide.” 27 However,
Todorov has pointed out: “the ‘internal’ nation proceeds from the
idea of equality, while the ‘external’ nation implies on the contrary
a preferential choice in favor of one’s own country over all the
others, thus implying inequality.” 28 This is the narrative of national
community that had formed in the “external” idea of France, the
geographical construction, which was legitimized by the
“internal,” cultural France. Once this distinction between the
French national community from its neighbors, once the cultural
and political had been overlapped, the idea that “The French have
become the foremost people of the universe”, proclaiming one
deputy in the National Assembly, was created. This notion of
liberating the beleaguered peoples of Europe from the tyranny of
monarchical government and despotism grew into the idea of
“mission civilatrice.” This was based on the moral notion that once
free, and once they had obtained the rights of man and citizen, it
was now the duty of the French people to be the beacon of reason
to the rest of the world, still under the grip of tyrannous kings.
Durand-Maillane wrote in 1791 that the new constitution “has to
make the people of France happy, and by imitation, all people.” 29
However, as Eugen Weber points out, it was the rural areas of
France, and those regions and populations that were hardly
“French” in the sense of Parisian “civilization,” that were made the
object of this “civilizing mission.” Weber makes the point that “the
26
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people of whole regions [of France] felt little identity with the
state or with people of other regions” even by 1870. 30 It seems
that France during and after the Revolution, made a greater effort
attempting to acclimate the French people to the “civilizing
process” than external peoples. A student in Paris, Georges
Valérie, wrote in 1901 that “Conquest is a necessary stage on the
road to nationalism…[A nation should] bring in larger unity
groups without a clear cultural identity, to draw in, to enrich, to
enlighten the uninstructed tribal mind, this is the civilizing mission
we cannot renounce.” 31 It was necessary to assimilate rural
populations for the simple fact that they were generally conceived
to have no culture of their own; they were still reliant on antiquated
ways. These communities could therefore only benefit from their
integration into the larger French community. Weber suggests it
may be easier to see the integration of peoples into national
communities in the light of colonialism. Throughout Western
Europe this process was hugely successful, mostly because of the
growth of nationalist education, mainly through the teaching of
history.
Schools taught potent lessons of morality focused on duty,
effort, and seriousness of purpose. This had been the goal of
François Guizot as early as 1833, when he defined the instruction
that schools were intended to provide: reading, writing, and
arithmetic to furnish essential skills, the teaching of French and of
the metric system to implant or increase the sense of unity under
French nationhood, moral and religious instruction to serve
spiritual and social needs. 32 The history of France before the Great
War was presented in a continuous chain, extending back to
Roman times, one text declaring “Here we are, more than two
thousand years ago, in the period when France was still called
Gaul.” 33 France here appears less a nation and more an essence
projected backwards, invoking the idea of la France éternelle.
French soldiers and statesmen became heroes; French culture and
30

Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France,
1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 486.
31
Quoted from Ibid, 486.
32
Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, 331.
33
Quoted from Ann-Louise Shapiro, “Fixing History: Narratives of World War I
in France,” History and Theory, Vol.36, No. 4, (Dec., 1997): 114.

33

style was made primary, the very expression of high art; class
conflict was completely excluded. In all this, France became a
nation, indeed a spirit that was eternal and undying. Increasingly,
French nationalism re-emphasized the differences between
France’s “mission civilatrice” and Germany’s Kultur and
Weltpolitik; two distinct teleological narratives, each giving divine
meaning to the community on opposite sides of the Rhine. These
kinds of narratives are what Etienne Balibar call “the two
symmetrical figures of the illusion of national identity”: where
history articulates both a national personality and a national
mission. 34 The comparison with Germany fundamentally shaped
the French national community before the war, and these
assumptions had a profound effect on how it responded in the early
days as the Germans invaded France herself.
Germany for its part saw not only an external difference
with France, but also to the east of her borders, to the lands of
Russia. The Prussian victory in 1870 had led most in the German
military and government to dismiss the French threat to the West,
fearing only the possibility of a two-front war. Russia’s huge army
and vastness of territory provided the Germans with an immediate
concern and also the opportunity to realize its own historical
mission. For many Germans, Russia provided the opportunities of
dynastic expansion, but also an exoteric calling of spirituality.
Sturm und Drang movement members Klinger and Lenz discerned
in Russia and its people a spiritual breadth, and even Rilke
considered Russia his spiritual homeland. Artists, musicians, and
philosophers from Wagner to Nietzsche, from Spengler to Thomas
Mann reveled in the exotic imagination of the East. 35 However,
this feeling also was coupled with the imperialistic designs of
many Germans, concluding that the Eastern peoples provided a
tabula rosa, where the people were still young, and nobly savage,
for which provided the opportunity for German Kultur to cultivate.
It became a fixation of the German imagination to “Drive to the
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East” (the Drang nach Osten) which had developed by at least the
1860s. This became a commonly held assumption of Germany’s
ultimate destiny in the ascension of Weltpolitik.
If history provided access to the new temporal conceptions
of nationalism, then geography and its teaching offered the same
for the spatial. With the learning of sciences and of cosmography,
the intake of general terms of geographical landscapes that are
codified in a descriptive language, presenting pupils with a
universal reference system, complete with uniform rules. 36
Geography provides names and legitimizes space, it was necessary
for the nation to move towards the resacralization of one part of
space – the national territory in the teaching of geography.
Germany told its students of the “special relationship to the
landscape” and incarnated a collective myth to conquer Russian
lands. 37 In France, the concept of the “Hexagon” was created. For
school students the geometric figure of the hexagon allowed them
to conceptualize the image of France as they learned the geography
of their country. They were also taught the départements as well;
learning to recite the departments’ names as well as their
prefectures and sub-prefectures. Of course, regional boundaries did
not always follow natural boundaries created by climate, weather,
rivers, and mountains. The Republic made great efforts in trying to
integrate these natural geographic realities with the abstract
boundaries of administrative units. School geography was
successful in implanting national identity and making this national
identity the property of every Frenchmen. 38
The outbreak of war in 1914 brought all these totalizing
principles to the forefront of daily life. Years of nationalist
sentiment and collective identity now spread over in all spheres of
cultural life. Furthermore, this was not merely a development left
to one nation, but was a phenomenon experienced by every nation
that entered the war, including America, usually presented by
historians as wanting to avoid the war. Ideological battles between
the academia of the belligerents were fought just as viciously as
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the war on the battlefield. In October 1914, virtually the entire
German academic profession - over 4,000 names, including almost
every professor at almost every German university - endorsed a
declaration entitled “An der Kulturwelt” (To the World of Culture).
Numbered among them were closet socialists, future pacifists, and
skeptics, including Max Weber and Alfred Einstein. 39 Their list of
denials concluded with two assertions: first, that the future of
European culture rested on the victory of German so-called
“militarism”; and secondly, that in defining this militarism there
was no distinction to be made between Prussia and the rest of
Germany, or between the German army and the German nation:
“both are one.” 40 “Our belief,” the declaration continues “is that
the salvation of all European culture depends on the victory for
which German ‘militarism’ is fighting, the discipline, the loyalty,
the spirit of sacrifice of the united free German people.” 41 German
Kultur, which embraced concepts that began with the community
but were defined nationally, the idea of Geist, was taken in contrast
to “civilization.” Rudolf Eucken, the German philosopher and
Nobel Prize winner published on “the world historical significance
of the German spirit,” asserting that Germany could not be
defeated while it remained truly united and stood fast in its inner
strength. 42 Hew Strachan argues that the war of 1914 had led the
Germans away from previous advances in culture, and placed them
on a new path:
The clash between civilization and Kultur took
German thought back to its late-eighteenth-century
roots. In condemning civilization, the philosophers
of 1914 were reflecting the rationality of the
Enlightenment and the consequences of the French
Revolution. They argued that, following what was
essentially an alien, French track, philosophy had
39
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elevated the rule of law and the rights of the individual,
and so had promoted selfishness and materialism.
At one level, therefore the summons of 1914 was a
call to rediscover the ideas of the Aufklärung and to
refurbish the memory of 1813. 43
It was yet another clash between the discourses of the traditional
and the Modern.
This declaration by the German academic profession only
legitimated the claims of their French counterparts. The French
responded with their declaration on November 3. It contained the
names of 100 members of the French literary and artistic world,
including Gerorges Clemenceau, Barrès, Debussy, Gide, Matisse,
and Monet. Declaring that “the intellectual and moral richness of
humanity is created by the natural variety and independence of all
nations’ gifts,” it was clear that it was a statement of the kind of
universalizing principle that the Republic had always claimed as
the self-anointed beacon of civilization.44 On December 12,
Bergson told the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques that
German philosophy was “a translation into intellectual terms of her
brutality, her appetites, and her vices.” Germany’s actions were
merely “barbarism reinforced by civilization.” 45 The image of the
barbarous German enemy was not merely used to legitimize the
war cause. It also offered an opportunity to be directed towards
particular ends, such as war loans or military recruitment, and to
solicit the support of foreign neutrals. 46
As the ideological battles were being fought with words
and documents, the realities of war were being experienced by
ordinary soldiers and civilians in the front-lines and in the
occupied territories. Few had to be read rhetoric about the brutality
of war in 1914. However, many used the nationalist discourse to
make sense of what was happening around them. As the Germans
approached the city of Lille, Madame Delahaye-Théry, witnessed
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the retreat of the French army, and wrote that “The Germans are
coming. It’s the end. The end for us.” 47 It must be remembered that
although most of the stories of German barbarization were
exaggerated, horrible events did take place. As Modris Eksteins
put it:
If babies were not systematically snatched from
mothers’ arms and smashed against brick walls, if
nuns were not deliberately sought out for sodomy,
rape, and slaughter, if old people were not made to
crawl on all fours before being riddled with bullets,
considerable numbers of hostages were shot,
including women and children and octogenarians. 48
It must also be remembered that the “atrocities” committed by the
Germans, while both real and definite, the representations used by
the French and Allies to designate the German enemy were also a
manner, and John Horne and Allan Kramer point out: “To find a
language for the realities of the German invasion.” 49 However,
taken further, it could also, and should be said that it was the
attempt at elucidation of the realities of warfare in the age of
national communities and total war. The Germans were certainly
not alone in perpetrating brutal acts in 1914, and the equivocal use
of imagery, such as myths of the franc-tireur and the French with
the severed hands, reduced a complex and emotionally charged
situation to an emblematic person or action. 50 Naturally, women
and children were for the French the most readily accessible link to
the imagery of a peaceful France forced into war by the German
aggressor. The image of raped women and severed hands became
the signifier to the cause of the national community. The myths
provided accessible justifications for the continuation of the war,
and outlined a purpose for the unity now obtained by the state. In
this way, the national community, the state, and the war were
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forged into one mentality, one experience, and one representation
that made the conflict seem as a fight to death, initiating a fatalism
and grim determination that only helped to totalize the war further.
Rudolf Binding, a German soldier serving on the Western
Front during 1918, wrote in his diary on August 12, expressing that
what he was experiencing during the war was something that was a
part of “uncontrollable movements and forces”:
In the end, even if an individual nation does not get
its deserts, humanity will. This generation has no
future, and deserves none. Anyone who belongs to
it lives no more. It is almost a consolation to realize
this. All that an individual can do to get out of the
wrack is to find some way of hewing out blocks of
stone wherewith to found a new structure which to
this generation will be nothing, and leave it as a
legacy to others. 51
Binding’s prophetic words would indeed become realized: the
legacy of the First World War would surely be remembered in
stone, but the largest exposition of the legacy of the “lost
generation” would be expressed through history itself. The
mistakes made prior to and during 1914 would be repeated again
and again to this very day. The language of the national
community, although apparently held to be singular to the specific
community, is in reality a universal logic aimed at totalizing. This
is how we must look at the First World War when attempting to
understand how and why this war, and the rest of the twentieth
century became the horrible blood-bath that it was.
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A Translation of Lu
Xun’s
“阿 Q 正 传”
Hallie Stebbins
Bucknell University

Preface
Lu Xun the writer was in many ways born of the
Revolution of 1911. Originally a writer of Classical Chinese, he
was one of the first to write in the Vernacular following the literary
revolution of 1917. This transition was prompted by the escalation
of nationalistic thought and the idea that China needed to reform
itself, in both the political and cultural arena. John Fairbank, in The
Cambridge History of China, quotes Hu Shi, one of Lu Xun’s
contemporaries, as stating, “A dead language can never produce a
living literature; if a living literature is to be produced, there must
be a living tool." 1 The “living tool” quickly developed into the
Vernacular. Lu Xun’s power in wielding that tool was almost
immediately recognized as significant. His short stories and essays
were culturally relevant, criticizing China’s outdated traditions and
Confucian rituals. Lu Xun’s first story,
狂人日記 Riji,
Kuangren
(
or
“A Madman’s Diary”) was published in May of 1918 and was
quickly followed by his slightly longer story, 阿Q 正 传, (Ah Q
Zhengzhuan, or “The True Story of Ah Q) in 1921.
阿 Q 正传was first translated into English in 1926, only
four years after its initial publication, by George Kin Leung.
According to the Encyclopedia of Literary Translation into
English, Leung’s translation “suffers from its flat and stilted
1

John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 467.

English” 2 but nevertheless retains value as the first translation of
Lu Xun’s writing into a Western language. In 1930, E.H.F. Mills
produced a slightly abridged translation of three of Lu Xun’s
stories, among them “阿Q 正传”, published in his volume The
Tragedy of Ah Gui. In 1938, two years after Lu Xun’s death, the
first edition of his Complete Works was published. Presently, all of
his diaries, essays, short stories, poems and translations are
available.
Although translations of “阿Q 正 传” emerged beginning in
the 1920s, it was after 1950 that two of the most recognized
translations today were produced. Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang
contributed the most comprehensive collection of Lu Xun’s stories
in translation in 1956, a collection which is still widely read today
and within which “阿Q 正 传” is translated into “fluent and smooth
English” 3 that has nevertheless been criticized for being too
British. Additionally, it has been pointed out that in their
translation, the Yangs fail “to register the different modes in which
Lu Xun writes literature in the vernacular, and by which he plays
with Chinese literary language.” 4 Indeed, in the Encyclopedia of
Literary Translation into English, Olive Classe also points out that
“some may find that the [Yangs’] translation does not reflect
adequately the various idiosyncratic voices of the authors.” 5
The Yangs’ translation stands in contrast to William A.
Lyell’s translation, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories in 1990.
Lyell translates Lu Xun’s words into American rather than British
English, and, according to the Encyclopedia, “successfully
capture[s] the nuances of stylistic diversity in the original…and
should be commended for its abundant scholarly references.” 6
Some critics will perhaps disagree; Lyell’s translation, although
“enthusiastic” with a style that is “racy and slangy,” makes
noticeable changes to the original Chinese, substituting modern
American phrases for those of early twentieth century China, in a
2
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clear act of domestication. 7 Hans J. Vermeer states that in all
translation, “one must translate, consciously and consistently, in
accordance with some principle respecting the source text.” 8
Lyell’s translation is widely-recognized as having a defined
skopos; in fact, in his introduction to the translation, Lyell states:
I have opted for the attempt to suggest something of Lu
Xun’s style in English, for more than any other modern
Chinese author, Lu Xun is inseparable from his style. I
have tried to recreate the experience of reading Lu Xun in
Chinese, often asking myself the question, ‘How would he
have said this if his native language had been American
English. 9
Lyell’s skopos is clearly to domesticate the text; he “leaves
the reader in peace as much as possible and moves the writer
towards him.” 10 Lu Xun’s statement, “连 他 先 前 的 行 状,” for
example, is translated as, “there is even some uncertainty regarding
his ‘background’” 11 in the Yangs’ translation, while Lyell
translates it as, “there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding his
‘official resume.’” 12 The term “official resume” immediately
identifies the translation as one that has been Westernized to a
certain extent, as well as domesticated. Later in Lu Xun’s original
version, Ah Q thinks “他 想：这 是 错 的，可 笑！油 煎 大 头
鱼，未 庄 豆 加 上 半 寸 长 的 葱 叶，城 里 却 加 上 切 玉 德
葱 丝，她 想：这 也 是 错 的，可 笑!” which the Yangs
translate (word for word) as, “‘This is wrong. Ridiculous!’ Again,
7
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when they fried large-headed fish in oil the Weizhuang villagers all
added shallots sliced in half an inch thick, whereas the
townspeople added finely shredded shallots, and he thought, ‘This
is wrong, too. Ridiculous!” 13 Lyell, however, in one of the more
obvious domestications in his translation, states, “That’s not right,
that’s flatass stupid!’ he thought to himself. ‘On the other hand, I
gotta remember that next to me, Wei Villagers are just a bunch of
hicks. They’ve never even seen how bigheads are fried in town.” 14
Lyell is arguably engaging in what Antoine Berman, in his essay
“Translation and the Trials of the Foreign,” calls Qualitative
Impoverishment. Lyell, in his use of modern American slang, has
“replace[d] terms, expressions and figures in the original with
terms, expressions and figures which lack their signifying or
‘iconic’ richness.” 15
Lyell’s domestication of the text is almost at odds with his
insertion of numerous footnotes in order to explain cultural
references. Lyell makes a conscious effort to preserve many of the
cultural references within the text, utilizing footnotes to clarify
those elements that would undoubtedly be unfamiliar to foreign
readers, such as Confucian ideas taken directly from the Analects.
The question arises, however, of the connection between Lyell’s
skopos and his placement of Chinese idioms throughout the text.
Throughout most of the text, Lyell is indeed seen to domesticate in
accordance with his aforementioned skopos. However, if Lu Xun’s
“native language had been American English,” 16 his culture
arguably would have been born of America as well. He certainly
would not have quoted the Analects, nor would he have mentioned
Confucius. Lyell chooses not to alter the Chinese, a decision that
does not align with his use of terms such as “hicks” and “flatass.”
Though he does not mention this in his introduction, it can be
assumed that his translation encompasses more than one skopos.
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A New Translation of Lu Xun’s “阿 Q 正 传”

阿Q “ 先
前阔”， 见 识高, 而
且“真能做”， 本来几 乎是一
个“ 完
人”了， 但可 惜他本质
上 还有一些缺 点。 最恼人
的是 在他头皮 上. 颇有几
处不知起 于任 时的癞疮
疤。这虽然也 在他的身
体， 而看阿Q 的意 思, 倒也
似乎以为不足贵的, 因为他
讳说“
癞”
以及以切近 于“赖”的
音， 后来推而广之, “光”也讳,
“亮”也讳，再后 来，连 “ 灯”
“
烛”
讳了
都。 一 犯讳，不问
后心与无心， 阿Q 便全疤通
红的发起怒 来, 估量了对
手， 口讷的他便 骂，其力
小的他便打； 然而不知怎
么一回事，总还是阿Q 吃
亏的时候多。 于是他渐渐
的变 了方针，大抵改为怒
目而视了。
1 Ah Q used to be a “well-off” man of far2 reaching knowledge and experience. He
3 was “highly competent” and, originally,
4 almost a “perfect person,” but
5 unfortunately, he had a few physical flaws,
6 the most annoying of which were on his
7 scalp. He had a few patches where at some
8 uncertain time leprosy scars had appeared.
9 Although these scars were a part of his
10 own body, Ah Q did not seem to find
11 them adequately noble, because he
12 avoided mentioning the word “leprosy”
13 as well as any words that sounded like it.

14 Later, he expanded upon this, refusing to
15 say the words “light” and “bright”. Later
16 still, even “lamp” and “candle” became
17 forbidden words. The moment anyone
18 said any of these words, whether
19 intentionally or not, Ah Q would become
20 furious, all of his scars turning red. He
21 would assess the perpetrator – if it were
22 someone who was weak in language, he
23 would verbally abuse him, and if it were
24 someone weak in strength, he would hit
25 him. Yet, peculiarly, it was usually Ah Q
26 who came off worse. As a result, he
27 gradually changed his method of attack
28 to, for the most part, an angry glare.
Translation Notes
In my translation, I chose to foreignize, rather than
domesticate. In my opinion, William Lyell’s translation produces a
text that is completely unlike Lu Xun’s original text; in fact, it falls
quite neatly into John Dryden’s definition of paraphrase. Lyell
states, “For more than any other modern Chinese author, Lu Xun is
inseparable from his style.” 1 Although agreeing with this
statement, I do not believe that Lyell’s translation has preserved Lu
Xun’s unique style. Therefore, even though I did not produce a
word for word translation, I attempted to bring the reader to the
author. In doing so, however, I recognized immediately several
problems that other translators had experienced.
I chose this particular passage for one simple reason: when
I first read it in English, I did not understand it. Perhaps due to the
fact that I was well aware that it was translated from Chinese, I
wondered if a pun had existed within the Chinese that had been
lost in translation. Specifically, I did not understand why Ah Q
extended his taboo to include words such as “bright” and “lamp.” I
thought that perhaps the Chinese words for “bright,” “lamp,” etc.
rhymed with the Chinese word for “leprosy,” and that the resulting
joke would not translate easily into English, due to the lack of
1
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homonyms. I thought that if I translated this passage myself, I
could translate it in such a way that those reading it in English
would also be able to understand the joke, or, at the very least,
better understand the passage itself. I wondered if I could produce
a foreignizing translation that was a bit clearer. After reading the
passage in its original Chinese, however, I did not experience any
immediate moment of clarity, as I expected I would – none of the
words in question seemed to rhyme in the slightest. Only after
considering the passage for a length of time did I come to any
semblance of a conclusion. The passage, like much of Lu Xun’s
writing, is polysemous. Ah Q is by very nature a foolish character.
The fact that he associates seemingly arbitrary words with his scars
attests to that; the passage therefore can indeed be read simply as
intending to further convey Ah Q’s idiocy. However, it is also
possible that Ah Q fears the shiny, reflective nature of his scars,
and mere mention of any word that signifies a light-producing
object angers him. When I referred to the Yangs’ translation, I
discovered that while I translated the phrase “癞 疮 疤” as
“leprosy scars,” the Yangs’ had translated it as “shiny ringworm
scars,” and Lyell had translated it as “shiny scars” from “an attack
of scabies.” The term “shiny,” however, is completely absent from
Lu Xun’s original work; in fact, aside from the words “light,”
“bright,” etc., there are no terms in the story that even have the
slightest connotation of reflection. Obviously, both the Yangs and
Lyell deemed the passage unambiguous in meaning, and inserted
the phrase “shiny” to give English readers an early clue of the joke
to come. However, if there is no “early clue” present in the
Chinese, then it is possible that Chinese readers and Westerners
reading a foreignized translation are equally likely to either
understand or be confused by the passage. Lu Xun’s positioning of
a subtle joke within his lines is evidence of his unique, polysemous
style, a style that even Lyell has acknowledged as “inseparable”
from Lu Xun himself. 2 In their efforts to participate in what
Antoine Berman calls “clarification,” both the Yangs and Lyell
have slightly diluted the subtlety of Lu Xun’s style in their
translations. In my translation, I decided not to leave the original
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joke in peace, choosing not to clarify (or hint at, as the case may
be) in English what is not clarified in Lu Xun’s original Chinese.
Another major issue I encountered with my translation, one
that has probably become evident by my discussion in the previous
paragraph, also deals with the phrase “癞 疮 疤.” “癞” is
pronounced “lai,” and is, quite simply, a sore-producing skin
disease. The two characters that follow it – “疮”, which means
“sore”, and “疤”, which means “scar” – do not alter the disease
itself; rather, they merely intensify the severity of the disease.
“癞,” then, is not leprosy, nor is it scabies or ringworm. In fact, it
has no name in English, nor, it seems, is it specific in Chinese. In a
twentieth century Chinese hospital, three patients who have
leprosy, scabies and ringworm, respectively, could all be
diagnosed has being plagued by “癞.” When I first translated the
passage, I decided not to translate the term “癞”, and, in
accordance with my skopos of foreignizing, simply left it as a
Chinese character. However, as I continued to translate, when I
arrived at the terms “light,” “bright,” “lamp,” and “candle,” I found
myself in an impossible situation. By allowing the character “癞”
to remain in my English translation, I had made it almost
impossible for readers to understand not only the joke, but the
passage as a whole, which is in opposition to my reasons for
translating in the first place. My skopos, in this instance, could not
exist peacefully with my desire to make the passage readable. I
decided, therefore, that I would choose a term that was more
foreign than ringworm or scabies, as I believed both of those terms
domesticated “癞” to a greater degree than was necessary. In
modern Western society, “scabies” has a comical air, while
“ringworm” does not quite have the connotations of severity that is
attached to the term “癞” in Chinese. Leprosy, with its
connotations of irregularity and gravity, as well as the slight air of
mystery that surrounds it, seemed to be a better fit. In choosing the
term “leprosy,” I believe I was able to preserve my skopos while at
the same time, producing a comprehensible translation.
The last sizable problem I encountered in my translation
was Lu Xun’s use of quotation marks to designate commonly-used
phrases in twentieth-century Chinese society. In his first line (lines
1-3), he uses the phrase, “先 前 阔”, which I translated as “used
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to be a well-off man.” “先 前” simply means “previously” or “in
the past.” However, the term “阔” is polysemous, and can be used
to mean “rich,” “broad” or simply “good.” Lyell chooses to
translate the term as “rich,” while I chose “well-off.” Though I do
believe Lu Xun is stating that Ah Q used to be wealthy, I wanted to
choose a term that would attempt to preserve the polysemy of
“阔” in my English translation.
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Transference and the
Ego: A
(Psycho)Analysis of
Interpsychic
Translation
Lauren A. Rutter
Bucknell University
Translation is a necessary part of ordinary psychological
development. A successful translation brings with it “unpleasure”
because the Kultur in which we live is a veneer of things we know
and have to suppress in order to mitigate the demands of the id
(das Es). Repression (die verdrangung) is motivated by our desire
not to feel unpleasure through translation. According to Freud,
manifestations of the id (das Es) are translated through the ego
(das Ich). The ego acts as the translator of drives (der Trieb) into
acceptable actions. Through the process of psychoanalysis, the
analyst assumes the role of the translator (ego).
Freud believed that spoken language is not important to
analysis of the unconscious. Spoken language has limits that do
not compare to the feelings or effects of the drives within us. In
nominalism, the thing is what the name is. Reality is bound by the
name you ascribe to that reality. Therefore, the world is defined by
the limits of language and given names. A notion of German
Romanticism is the possibility of infinite potentiation of language.
Language lacking limits has a magical quality that links two
worlds. There is a double consciousness between the two worlds
of thought/drive and the linguistic expression of the thought/drive.

One defines the other and they are interlocked. When drives are
translated into words by the ego and then expressed, this double
consciousness produces a double figuration. There is a translation
process from drive into language within the self, and then another
translation from language of the self into an outward expression to
the analyst.
The process of transference (die Übertragung) is suggested
by Freud to be a false connection. The client experiences
thoughts, feelings, and memories derived from previous events and
relationships and projects these onto the analyst. In this process,
through the translation of thoughts into expression to the analyst,
the client redirects feelings towards the analyst himself/herself.
The connection is false because instead of fixing the actual
problem, the problem is transferred to the analyst. The patient
believes that through expression, he/she is being finally
understood. The client may develop erotic feelings for the
therapist; these feelings may actually form a barrier and interfere
with the analyst helping the client.
Freud believed that the desire for cathexis (die Besetzung)
drives us. Cathexis is the libido’s charge of energy. This psychic
energy is attached to a person, object, or body. The release of this
charge of energy creates a feeling of pleasure, whereas, a
successful translation brings with it “unpleasure.” Repression and
transference are defense mechanisms used to cope with the
unconscious unpleasure.
Freud believed in three kinds of translations: intrasystemic,
intersystemic, and interpsychic. An intrasystemic translation
occurs writing a system of one language where there is a transfer
of one to another. An intersystemic translation is between
languages or somatic systems. For example, a hysteric performs
an intersystemic translation from body (ailments) to language
(complaints). The type of translation most applicable to
transference (die Übertragung) is interpsychic. This translation
focuses on the shift from object to object. Counter-transference is
also an interpsychic translation.
According to Freud, all of the following are translations:
dreams, hysterical, obsessive and phobic symptomatologies,
parapraxes, fetishes, choice of means of suicide, and the analyst’s
interpretations. To focus on the last example, the analyst’s own
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interpretations are a translation of the client’s expressed emotions
and behaviors. If the analyst is translating the already translated
double figuration, he/she becomes a third variable that deduces the
original drive (das Trieb). The analyst becomes the ego, but is
only human and thus imperfect. A translator can make mistakes,
and drives can be translated inaccurately. The ego cannot make
mistakes unless it is pressured by the id to act in a malevolent way.
The translator can easily make a mistake in evaluating a patient if
he/she is not careful.
In analyzing the patient, it is pivotal to be accurate in order
to provide an appropriate treatment plan. If the analyst makes
mistakes in translation, he/she is putting the patient at risk. One
way in which the analyst could make an error is by becoming too
involved in the patient’s own testimonies and narratives and thus
transfer his/her own repressed feelings to the patient. This is a
phenomenon known as counter-transference. Counter-transference
may lead to a skewed translation of drives.
Whereas Freud emphasizes transference and countertransference as projective identification techniques through an
interpsychic translation, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan
revises Freud in viewing the self as constituted by its relationship
to an other, with the primary developmental stage beginning with
the experience of viewing oneself in a mirror. Lacan’s mirror
stage is the first moment in which the subject recognizes the self in
a mirrored reflection. A transformation takes place when the
subject assumes identification in an image. This transformation
becomes an interpsychic translation.
Lacan described his ideas as “Return to Freud” because he
translated the ideas of Freud into a structural-linguistic
terminology that removed agency and subjectivity in their
interpretation. Though Lacan believed his philosophy was “Return
to Freud” in nature, many of his ideas differed significantly from
Freud’s. For instance, Freud believed that the unconscious and
linguistic conscious were two separate entities, very segregated
and only joined through the ego’s translation. Lacan, on the other
hand, believed that the unconscious was as complicated as the
conscious and therefore also structured linguistically. "For Lacan,
Freud's central insight was not…that the unconscious exists, but
that it has structure, that this structure affects in innumerable ways
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what we say and do, and that in thus betraying itself it becomes
accessible to analysis." 1
Julia Kristeva departs from Lacanian ideology and argues
that Lacan’s bracketing of the drives (Trieb) “castrates” Freud’s
discovery. In Kelly Oliver’s “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father and the
Crisis of the Paternal Function,” she writes, “Kristeva, protecting
the Father of psychoanalysis from this castration threat by his most
prodigal son, reinscribes the drives in language. Her tactic is to
reinscribe language in the body, arguing that the dynamics that
operate the Symbolic are already working within the material of
the body and the presymbolic imaginary.” 2 It was Kristva’s goal
to trace the signifier through the body in order to reinscribe the
body in language at the same time.
For herself, Kristeva sets up the difficult task of connecting
the body and language, and she chose to do so by recovering a
repressed maternal body and the abject maternal body. The
connection of language to body is an interpsychic translation
because it translates one object through another object. This case
uses language and bodies as the two objects. In addition to the
maternal body, Kristeva uses the notion of the imaginary father to
connect body and language. The imaginary father is defined by
Oliver as a screen for the mother’s love, associated, as it is, with
the child’s relationship to its conception and the mother’s womb.
“The imaginary father provides the support necessary to allow the
child to move into the Symbolic. This is a move from the mother’s
body to the mother’s desire through the mother’s love…The
semiotic body is abjected if necessary, but only for the sake of
what motivates the bond in the first place: maternal love.” 3
Maternal love is a translator from body to desire, and therefore an
interpsychic translation. In order to understand this translation, it
is necessary to understand the notion of the semiotic body of
Kristeva and mirror stage of Lacan.
1
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Kristeva believes that semiotic activity is the work of
drives that stem from a semiotic body. 4 She studies the drives that
emerge prior to the mirror stage. Kristeva searches to describe the
way in which the infant body becomes the body proper. Oliver
writes, “She (Kristeva) complains that for Lacan the subject is
constituted at the expense of “the real,” the drives, from which the
subject will forever be cut off.” 5 Kristeva wants to move away
from the notion of symbolic drives and focus on the real. For
Lacan, drives are symbolic. The analyst must assume the role of
the ego and translate the symbolic drives expressed by a client.
Kristeva is concerned with Lacan’s concept of the drive
(Trieb) because if the drive is already a symbol, the process of
signification becomes lost and the move between the semiotic and
the symbolic is “replaced with nothingness.” The lack brings out
the unitary being of the subject, and the subject’s being is founded
on this lack. Therefore, the drives are lost. “The subject of desire
lives at the expense of his drives, ever in search of the lacking
object.” 6 At this point, it is the role of the analyst to step in and
interpret the drive so that the drive is not searching futilely for a
missing object. If the translator cannot assist, there is the threat of
no transference and therefore no interpsychic translation. The one
being translated is stuck in a confused state and is unable to replace
one object with another. However, there is also the optimistic
notion of the subject translating his/her own drives without the
assistance of a therapist who could skew the translation if
transference, counter-transference, or a simply a misinterpretation
of drives occurs. There is the idea of bringing back the semiotic
body to define the self without a third-party translator. The ego
itself can translate.
“For Kristeva, within Lacanian theory the living body is
sacrificed to desire. It becomes only a sign.” 7 Kristeva argues that
when language is not mixed with drives, the drives become
repressed. Since the drives are repressed, one must enter into the
4
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symbolic realm and transcend the self to discover them.
Drives/desires/emotions experienced in the symbolic realm are not
real, and when one enters this realm for too long or cannot escape,
he/she must search for a translator to help them come back to the
real world. This translator is the analyst/therapist. However,
losing the ability to distinguish between the real world and
imaginary or symbolic, is becoming psychotic. In Kristeva’s
Revolution in Poetic Language, she writes, “…the exemplary
subject of Lacanian desire is the masochistic neurotic engaging in
autocastration and bodily mutilation or the completely catatonic
body of the clinical schizophrenic.” 8 Translation of drives is a
necessary part of psychological development and must be done to
remove the self from the symbolic realm and understand the real.
Kristeva has several specific concerns with Lacan’s mirror
stage. They are:
Lacan’s account of the mirror stage emphasizes the body as
other, the body as symbol reflected in the “mirror.” It
throws us into a hall of mirrors where we can no longer
identify the “real” of the body; the real body is
impossible…Lacan’s account covers over the fact that
without the body there would be no reflection in the
mirror. 9
Here, Kristeva struggles to explain what motivates the transition
from the presymbolic to the symbolic. Oliver writes that “Lacan,
of course, posits the castration threat as the motive. But in order to
experience this threat in the first place, the child must take the
position as a subject in the mirror stage.” 10 The child must realize
that simultaneously he/she is and is not his/her image. The image
is a symbol, but it is also real. To see what is real, a translation
must occur between the body and the image of the body, the other.
Kristeva argues that the mirror stage requires a negation of the
other to identify the subject as self.
A translation is impossible when one cannot distinguish
between subject and other. If there is no transference between
8
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object and another there is also no transcendence of the subject.
The subject is stuck in a realm without the possibility of selfdiscovery and needs a translator to explain the symbolic and the
real. Herein lies another problem identified by Kristeva with
Lacan’s theory: the paradox of its cyclical motion. She believes
that for Lacan, “…the child takes a position as subject so that he
can negate his image in order to take a position as subject.” 11
Clearly, when the mirror stage is already symbolic, it cannot be
used to explain the onset of the Symbolic. Kristeva believes that
the only way to explain the change from presymbolic to symbolic
is to acknowledge the “material element, which is heterogeneous to
the Symbolic.” Rejection is not unique to the symbolic, but it
operates first in the semiotic body. This is different from Lacan’s
view that the symbol opens up the world of negativity.
Kristeva uses psychoanalytic principles of Freud to further
prove that negativity is “gestural and kinetic – the bodily act of
throwing and retrieving the reel.” 12 She believes that the Symbolic
is founded both in lack and excess because if it were “merely
founded on a lack, then there is all the more reason for avoiding it
altogether, for taking refuge in neurosis and psychosis.” 13 Since
the primary example of material negativity is anality, the notion of
the Symbolic founded solely on lack is disrupted. “In anality,
rejection precedes the Symbolic.” 14 This disproves the Lacanian
theory that the move from presymbolic to symbolic is motivated by
a castration threat or sense of lack. In the place of lack, Kristeva
credits the notion of excess and pleasure that moves the child into
the Symbolic realm. The id and libido drives are therefore keys in
the discovery of the Symbolic realm. Excess is equally as harmful
as lack, and best controlled by the ego. Drives must be translated
by the ego to make sense of the self and remain balanced.
Kristeva’s feminist psychoanalytic theory places an
emphasis Lacan’s notion of returning to dyadic union. Lacan
believed that we are unconsciously trying to return to the dyadic
union of mother and child, which is lost in the mirror stage.
Kristeva explores the maternal function in and before the child’s
11

Ibid., 45.
Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 170.
13
Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 45.
14
Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 151.
12

57

attaining of subjectivity and entrance into the Symbolic realm.
“For her, material rejection operates according to a maternal logic,
which prefigures the Law of the Father. This law before the Law
is the law of the mother’s body which regulates the oral and anal
drives.” 15 To explain this notion of law before Law, Kristeva uses
the semiotic chora, the organizing principle of the maternal body.
Kristeva defines the chora in a footnote in “Le sujet en proces”:
The chora is a womb or a nurse in which elements are
without identity and without reason. The chora is a place
of chaos and which is and which becomes, preliminary to
the constitution of the first measurable body…the chora
plays with the body of the mother – of woman – , but in the
signifying process.” 16
In the chora, “maternal regulation sets up paternal
prohibition.” The mother is the regulator of what goes into and out
of her child’s body. She regulates the child’s body in relation to
her own. “Kristeva maintains that the first sounds the child makes
mimic his mother-child dyadic bodily relationship.” 17 The mother
acts as the translator for her child’s drives, filtering out the
important and unimportant so that there is no excess or lack.
In order for the child to see itself as a separate entity from
his/her mother, an interpsychic translation from object to object is
required. The child must see the difference of his/her being from
the mother in order to attain more complex drives of his/her own
and language. When the child can see himself/herself as separate
from the mother, there is the responsibility to translate drives with
one’s own ego. This may create a problem for those who are
dependent on the translations of their mothers for what is right and
wrong. When the child realizes that he/she is not the mother,
he/she becomes a new subject and creates new language that
mimics the words of the mother. Kristeva argues that, “…it is the
incorporation of the patterns of language through speech of the
other that enables the infant to communicate and thus commune
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with others.” 18 Since communication is central in psychotherapy,
language and imitation translation of the mother’s language in is
necessary for transcendence of the self. When the child’s
realization in the mirror stage forces a break in the dyadic union,
the child’s own ego must become the translator. The mother as
translator of drives will no longer suffice because the connection
has been severed.
For Kristeva, to become autonomous, a child must break
away from identification by abjecting its mother. The child
“…must move from an identification with the mother’s nourishing
breast to an identitication with its own birth and the horrifying
maternal sex…” 19 Abjection is defined as “an absence (the
normative condition of the pre-mirror-stage infans) or a collapse
(the condition of the borderline patient) of the boundaries that
structure the subject.” Kristeva herself defines abjection as what
disturbs identity, system, and order.” 20 Kristeva’s writings suggest
that the maternal body is an abject threat to the Symbolic.
Examples of prohibition against the maternal body are seen though
the oedipal prohibition against incest of Freud, against maternal
desire (jouissance) of Lacan, and/or against the semiotic chora of
Kristeva. 21
For Kristeva, the primary drive pleasure threatens the
Symbolic, and is therefore repressed. Oliver writes that, “It (the
maternal body) threatens to uncover the process that leads to the
appearance of unity and thereby expose that unity as merely one
moment in the process. The unity of reason or consciousness
cannot admit that it is part of a process that alternates between
unity and the fragmentation and repetition of drives.” 22 The
mother and child must sacrifice their connection so that the child
can become a subject proper.
While the mother and child are in a dyadic union, the
mother negotiates the demands of the child’s drives. The mother,
in providing a good model for behavior and language, also acts in
18
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the role of the superego. However, once the mother becomes the
abject, she does not correspond to an ego. 23 The abject is excluded
from the superego because it threatens the Symbolic and the
identity of the newly established and autonomous subject. The
child now is forced to create his/her own supergo and ego to
manage the demands of the drives.
For Lacan, an interpretive act centers on the indirection of
language. In Volume 7 of Comparative Criticism, Gary Handwerk
writes on Lacan’s indirection of language and uses a translation to
explain the detours taken by the speaking subject in the path to
communication, “…That in which one must be interested is in the
point of knowing why she wished precisely that the other person
understand that, and why she did not say it to him clearly, but by
allusion…If you understand, you are wrong…” 24 Lacan’s analysis
of the indirection of language can be used to explain an ironic
sense of self-identity which “lies at the heard of ironic selfpresentation.” 25 The child who has just recognized his/her image
in a mirror reflection becomes the subject who is dependent on
others for status at any point. Hardwerk writes, “There is no such
entity as a subject, except by and with other subjects. This is a
subject whose definition is finally impossible…it is the sum of its
interrupted encounters with all its significant others, which serve as
moments of entry into death…which alone can definitively identify
the subject.” 26 The subject becomes the other in the mirror stage.
For Freud, the risk of reduction of otherness is solved by
internalizing the other within the self. The unconscious is an other
that is always surrounding the subject. Even in becoming a
separate subject from the mother, the unconscious is not
accessible. The unconscious cannot be translated. Lacan writes,
“That in the subject, which is in the object and is not of the subject,
is the unconscious. The unconscious exists in and through speech,
but is inaccessible insofar as the signification of that speech can
remain concealed, censured by the ego.” 27 The ego translates
23
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selectively to protect the self, and filters the drives that are harmful
to the body and mind.
Drives are essential to being human. The conscious,
unconscious and preconscious are all translated into behaviors and
emotions. In dyadic union, the mother is the translator for the
child’s drives. Her translation is perfect until the child realizes
they must be their own being in the mirror-stage of development.
In a break from the dyadic union, the child attains subjectivity and
agency. At this point, the mother loses the ability to translate the
drives of her child and the child’s drives are translated by the self.
The ego of the child becomes the translator of drives. The ego is a
stable and accurate translator, unless defense mechanisms fail and
the unconscious drives of the id pervade. If the ego fails to be a
translator that molds to fit societal and cultural norms, the subject
may decide to go through psychotherapy. At this point, the analyst
is the translator. The analyst, however, will never be as effective
as the mother or unblemished ego since the translation gets skewed
as it is passed from self to language to analyst. The pure
translation of the mother is lost in development of the child.
Although the loss of the pure translation is unconscious, it creates
an “unpleasure” that cannot be rectified. The self is not in a
constant state of suffering, however, so long as the ego can
compensate for the “unpleasure” through its own interpsychic
translation and defense mechanisms such as transference. In
psychological development, an interpsychic translation by the ego
takes the place of a pure translation of the mother.
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Overstepping
Otherness:
Christine de Pizan and
Letitia Elizabeth
Landon’s Genealogical
Retranslations of
Canonized Text
A. Joseph McMullen
Bucknell University
Goethe writes, “Everything great molds us from the
moment we become aware of it.” 1 Harold Bloom’s essay
“Antithetical Criticism: An Introduction,” the precursor to The
Anxiety of Influence, relates how every poet must face anxiety
about surmounting preceding poets. The Romantic poets—
Wordsworth, Keats, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, Blake—were faced
with going beyond Milton who had to surpass Donne who had to
somehow transcend Shakespeare, etc. As each new poet is faced
with a genealogy that they must rise above in order to canonize
themselves, they confront a problem that leads to an undeniable
anxiety. What these poets must do to overcome genealogy is to
find a way to retranslate previous poets in order to canonize
1
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themselves. This pursuit, not only incredibly difficult for a male
writer to accomplish, is even more complicated for the ‘Other:’
woman. For feminine canonization, woman must not only
transcend those of a genealogical past, woman must overcome a
principally patriarchal history which forces a radical retranslation
of the male dominated canon. Christine de Pizan, a medieval
French writer, and Letitia Elizabeth Landon, a Romantic poet, are
women who, though faced with Otherness, broke the bounds of not
only the male canon but also patriarchal definitions of woman.
This goal is accomplished through ‘completion’ of a canonized
author’s text and, often, a calculated misreading of a text to further
explore or present it in a feminine aspect. Christine and Landon
are forced to retranslate important texts—they must “invaginate” a
source text and, in completing or mistranslating the text, allow
their retranslation to grant female canonization, genealogically
based political progress, and, ultimately, an affirmation of their
personal uniqueness in the realm of a feminine genius.
“The Only Female Member of a Male Canon”: Christine de
Pizan’s Genealogical Retranslation for Means of Canonization
Christine de Pizan overcomes genealogy by first
canonizing herself among male figures of an older canon. Keven
Brownlee’s article “Christine de Pizan: Gender and the New
Vernacular Canon” reveals how Christine writes a series of
autobiographical accounts in which she encounters Jean de Meun,
Dante, Ovid, Boccaccio, and Boethius—who all act as a personal
canon for her to transcend. “In these works, Christine engages
quite polemically with each of her authorities in turn, rewriting
these auctores in accord with the requirements of her ongoing and
self-authorizing autobiographical project. At the same time, she
establishes her own status as a member of the new multilingual
canon—French, Italian, Latin—that she has set into place as
such.” 2 Christine is thus, by rewriting these auctores, retranslating
them. She will not only ‘complete’ their texts from her perspective
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but will also retranslate from the source text into a dynamic,
“hybrid” target language 3.
Christine de Pizan begins by displacing Jean de Meun:
“…the single most important author figure in the French
vernacular canon.” 4 She does this in her Debat sur le “Roman de
la Rose” which is translated as Debate on the “Romance of the
Rose.” Christine presents a public debate on de Meun’s text,
Romance of the Rose, as an event in her autobiography. This
debate not only undermines de Meun’s text but is also the first ever
such debate in French literary history. 5 Second, in Chemin de
longue estude, Christine manipulates Dante’s Divine Comedy in a
narrative that presents her as a regendered Italian Dante who writes
in French. 6 Next, “…the onset of her widowhood and the
beginning of her literary career” is set in Mutacion de Fortune in a
retranslation of Ovid’s Metamorphosis which focuses on a gender
transformation of woman to man. Christine is able to empower
herself as a woman historian but also reveal a startling gender
change. 7 Not only is Christine rewriting and completing these
canonized works in relation to an autobiographical context—
penetrating the texts with the feminine—she is also constructing
herself as a woman who has lived through and beyond these men.
The fourth retranslation is in the Cite des Dames, where Christine
de Pizan “…radically and visibly rewrites her Boccaccian model,
the De mulieribus claris,…in such a way as to present herself as a
‘corrected’ Boccaccio figure, regendered, vernacularized, and
writing in the first person. Boccaccio’s third-person, maleauthored Latin treatise on women is rewritten as Christine’s French
autobiography.” 8 Coming out of a retranslation of Boccaccio,
Christine then authoritatively cites herself as an auctor in the Livre
des Trois Vertus. By doing this, she presents herself as a member
of her canon and then completes this personal canon in part 3 of
the Avision. 9 Here, Christine “stages herself…as a regendered
3
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Boethius” who is also the “legitimate descendent—as
autobiographical subject, as writer, and as thinker—of her
“canonical predecessor.” 10 Christine uses genealogical
retranslation to insert herself as the only female member of an all
male canon.
In penetrating and entering an all male canon, despite
presenting herself as regendered, Christine is faced with the
problem of masculinization. In Cite des Dames Christine
constructs an all-female canon and, as its writer and creator,
successfully transcends her own text. She does this by presenting
the female writers Cornificia, Proba, and Sappho as masters of
their craft. Cornificia “…through a combination of native talent
and exceptionally hard study, becomes a master poet.” 11 Proba is
similarly shown as a master poet but also a master Virgilian.
Proba’s work consists of rewriting Virgil under a feminineChristian lens. 12 Sappho’s literary innovation and productivity are
stressed as well as the idea that her literary achievements go
beyond the classical world and maintain influence in the present.
Furthermore, Carmenta—the inventor of the Latin alphabet—and
Minerva—as a Greek maiden taken for a goddess and also inventor
of a shorthand Greek script—are also situated within the text.13
These women all share a common theme in that they are able to
attain achievements that are equal to if not more superior than their
male counterparts. Christine de Pizan’s strategy “…for
establishing herself as a new kind of “canonical” woman writer
involves her presentation of an all-female literary and writerly
canon firmly situated in the temporal remoteness of the classical
world. The fifteenth-century Christine is authorized by the
example of this canon but remains distant from it.” Thus, since
this canon does not include any contemporary woman writers,
Christine maintains authority as the only and best of the new
canon. As well, Cite des Dames authorizes her as truly the only
woman writer in an all male canon. Far from complete
regendering of herself, she creates and situates herself in a
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woman’s canon which asserts her undeniable femininity and
uniqueness.
After positioning herself above both a past male and female
canon, Christine then takes the steps necessary to maintain a
genealogical link to contemporary French poets that are developing
a new vernacular literary canon in tying herself to Eustache
Deschamps. In a letter to Deschamps, she sets up a “hierarchical,
genealogical relationship with Deschamps” by naming him as a
distinguished poet and then saying that she is his student or even
disciple. 14 Christine formulates an identity with Deschamps from
just writing to him. Deschamps responds in a ballade in which he
bestows upon her “canonical status” and even names her his
“sweet sister.” 15 In setting up a master-disciple relationship with
Deschamps, she links herself again to the vernacular canon. This
genealogical stratagem reinforces Christine’s autobiographical
retranslations of Jean de Meun, Dante, Ovid, Boccaccio, and
Boethius and her recreation and feminine emphasis of the lives of
Sappho, Cornificia, and Proba because it further separates her from
them. With this third genealogy, Christine strengthens her
contemporariness and femininity. As she is clearly a woman—
thanks to the second genealogy—this last genealogy makes her
unique in her status as the only female writer of a male canon.
“Her ‘unique’ status as female canonical writer is doubled by
special links to two key classical writerly models, which provide
her with a kind of supplementary prestige at the same time as they
highlight her own exemplary characteristics as a writerly model in
her own right…” 16 Christine is figured not as a member of a
classical canon or a womanly canon, but “…as the only female
member of a male canon”—one who looked Otherness in the face
and transcended it.
The Penetration of the Poetess: Letitia Landon’s Use of
Genealogical Retranslation in Subverting the Identity of the
“Poetess”
According to Virginia Blain, the word “poetess” was used
in the late Romantic/early Victorian period to denote a female
14
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poet. At its most neutral, it was a generic term but, often, the
connotation was derogatory. Similar to “poetaster,” “poetess”
could signify a woman poet who simply imitates men or true
poetry and ascends no higher. 17 Letitia Landon, one of the first
“poetesses,” interestingly expresses and embraces the dual nature
of the poetess. Glennis Stephenson suggests Landon’s “Poetic
self, L.E.L., manages to challenge and subvert, at the very same
time as it submits to, the boundaries assigned to the poetess.” 18
Landon, as a professional poet, was a self-sufficient woman who
wrote to ensure the survival of her family. She would write about
what would sell—romance, sensuality, vicariousness, etc. Thus,
she plays the role of the imitator but, similar to Christine de Pizan,
actually uses genealogical subversion underneath her words to
canonize herself. In mistranslation and retranslation of already
quickly canonized Romantic male poets, Landon establishes
herself among and even beyond their accomplishments.
Identified as the “Byron of our Poetesses,” Landon actively
manipulated Byronic texts in her pursuits. Adriana Craciun writes
that in “The Enchantress,” “Landon develops a Promethean,
distinctly Luciferean model of poetic identity and self-creation.
She accomplishes this by rewriting the biblical fall, and the birth of
a poet, in a distinctly (proto)feminist way and yet also Byronic
way.” 19 Landon identifies that Byron’s heroes are dangerously
misogynistic and, in doing so, defines the possibility of the woman
poet rather than poetess. 20 The heroine of this text can be viewed
as a regendered extension of Manfred and the speaking self never
allowed to Astarte. 21 In Manfred, a dramatic poem by Lord Byron,
Manfred is a Byronic hero—fallen, alone, refusing to be
dominated, and introspective. Astarte, his love, dies when she sees
Manfred in his fallen nature and symbolizes the notion that women
become the victims of liberty—those dependent upon the
patriarchy die. Manfred, refusing to be dominated even by God,
17
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cannot escape himself or his memory22 but can escape, for at least
some time, from the patriarchy. Manfred wants knowledge and
spiritual power but, ultimately, cannot create this freedom without
destruction. Landon retranslates the Byronic Manfred into a
female Medora in “The Enchantress.” Medora is similarly
Satanic 23 but also, “Like Byron’s Astarte then, the Enchantress has
both Manfred’s immortal longings, forbidden knowledge, and
disillusionment, as well as the pity and tenderness which he lacked,
and loved in Astarte.” 24 Furthermore, the Byronic Enchantress,
out of pity, assumes the life of the dying Medora—showing
Landon’s notion that the “Satanic overreacher” acquiring
forbidden knowledge is, in Byron’s poetry, “attained largely at the
expense of women.” 25 Landon ‘misreads’ Byron in order
retranslate and regender the Byronic hero. Through misreading,
Landon completes the hero and gives a voice to the female
characters in Byron’s poetry. She revises “Byronic conceits” for a
distinctly feminist end—empowering the woman with speech.
Landon also rereads and retranslates Shelley and
Wordsworth. Craciun connects “The Prophetess” as a response to
Shelley’s “Ozymandias.” 26 In “Ozymandias” a first person
narrator meets a traveler who found a statue in the desert. This
statue is of Ozymandias, the king of kings, who arrogantly
commands one to look on his great works and despair, but now
nothing remains except the colossal wreck of the statue. Similar to
“Ozymandias,” the Prophetess “teaches that human work and art
are powerless against destruction” but Landon does not suggest the
“possibility that poetry or truth survives the desolation and decay,
instead suggesting…that Power and Nothingness alone withstand
time.” 27 Landon again completes a canonized poet by retranslating
his poetry. However, Landon interestingly manipulates a reverse
notion of canonization to do it. Ideally, canonization would entail
the survival of works. Instead, only power and nothingness
22
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withstand time—the power to retranslate Shelley and insist on his
nothingness. If Landon can, with such ease, retranslate and
regender she will, as Christine, actually survive with time in the
emphasis of the power of her uniqueness.
Craciun goes on to relate that in “Life Surveyed,” Landon
“rereads William Wordsworth’s idealized nature and reveals the
material decay Wordsworth tried to transcend.” 28 For
Wordsworth’s poetry, where nature becomes an inspiration,
bowers become the womb 29 and in “Tintern Abbey” this parallel is
completed as the poet can establish a kind of dyadic union 30 with
nature. Language is needed to describe the state, but nature can
still allow for transcendence to the state. Craciun writes that:
“Landon’s ironic treatment [in “Life Surveyed”] of the landmark
Romantic experience of transcendence on a mountain top
demonstrates that the ‘purity’ and ‘glories’ of such transcendent
visions are only possible through active denial of the ultimately
inescapable ills of the material, and in this case distinctly urban,
world and its ‘close and bounded atmosphere’.” 31 Landon here
completely retranslates the Wordsworthian affinity with nature
from that of an ultimate state of transcendence to one of denial.
This retranslation not only reveals the practicality of woman in the
shadow of male idealism, it reveals an acceptance of the Symbolic
Order. Landon has accepted law, language, desire, civilization,
28

Ibid., 231.
This is the case in Wordsworth’s “Nutting.”
30
The dyadic union or the Imaginary is defined by Lacan as the bond between
mother and child in the womb and directly afterwards. All the child knows is
the mother and therefore together they have a unity. The child defines itself
through the mother and really does not know the idea of “I.” In order to attain
subjectivity, the child must leave the dyadic union. This happens through the
father in the mirror stage. Within the Symbolic Order the child becomes “I.”
The child sees their reflection in a mirror and realizes that they are a separate
entity from the mother. When this happens, the dyadic union is broken and the
child begins to have desire, law, separation, and ultimately, language as they
agglomerate into a body ready to enter civilization. Lacan insists that
humankind is always, unconsciously, trying to return to the dyadic union
because of the repression created once one leaves the union. However, the
“only” way back is through dreams and, generally, death.
Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (New York, NY:
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1985), 99-101.
31
Craciun, Fatal Women of Romanticism, 231.
29

70

and consciousness—using language as her profession to survive in
the urban world. This use of genealogy is not simply that of
dismantling Wordsworth but, more importantly, a penetration—
invagination—of Wordsworth poetry for female political progress.
This continuing motif of manipulation of genealogy for not
only self-canonization but female progress is found again in
Landon’s retranslation of Thomas Lovell Beddoes—a noncanonized poet. Beddoes’ The Improvisatore is retranslated in
Landon’s The Improvisatrice. Landon rewrites this long poem in a
very similar format to Beddoes but from a female viewpoint to
correct his “tortuous misogyny.” 32 Virginia Blain suggests that she
does this in her usage of Sappho as “a model of doomed female
genius.” 33 Sappho’s problem “…is the inevitable loss of love
suffered by a woman who exhibits her genius in public (prostitutes
herself)…” The Sappho described in Landon’s poem is similar to
the poetess: she must write in the public sphere to make money or
gain any recognition. But, in order for a woman to write
something that a man would want to read in the 19th century she
would have to write from the viewpoint of the Other. She would
have to give the reader something no man could—but, in the
process, possibly suffer from remaining as the Other. Landon
neatly sidesteps the ‘public woman’ dilemma by “…constructing
her poetry as a kind of tragic peepshow, and the ‘poetess’ as
puppet/victim. This was a very successful strategy because it left
an implied space beyond the L.E.L. masquerade for the reader to
imagine some ‘real’ agent at work.” 34 Landon’s retranslations then
often situate her writing as the Other but, when ‘stripping’ away
the more vulgar language, a woman’s genealogical pursuit for
political progress is found.
Translational Transcendence of Otherness and Embracing the
Feminine Genius
In Translation and Gender: Translating in the “Era of
Feminism,” Luise von Flotow writes: “Gender awareness in
translation practice poses questions about the links between social
32
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stereotypes and linguistic forms, about the politics of language and
cultural difference, about the ethics of translation, and about
reviving inaccessible works for contemporary readers. It
highlights the importance of the cultural context in which
translation is done.” 35 Christine de Pizan and Letitia Landon both
retranslate their predecessors in explicitly gendered ways.
Canonized texts are retranslated as Christine and Landon
invaginate them—penetrating the text for distinct, genealogically
based political progress. These women, despite being faced with
Otherness, do not accept their ‘position’ but actively subvert it
through interventionist retranslation. As von Flotow describes in
her notion of interventionist feminist translation: feminist
translators will often “correct” texts—intervening and making
changes to a source text that departs from a feminist perspective. 36
This is exactly what Christine and Landon accomplish in their
genealogical retranslations, regardless of whether or not
canonization is achieved. Both Christine and Landon are able to
transcend Otherness and, in doing so, attain feminine genius
through a unique creation of their own types of language.
Martin Le Franc insists of “…Christine as the single—but
glorious and triumphant—female member of the new French
literary canon that she had herself earlier expanded and regendered
by a strategic act of self-inclusion.” 37 As Christine uses
genealogical retranslation to insert herself into the canon, she is
able to step outside of Otherness while remaining a woman.
Because of her unique gendered status as the only woman author
of a fully male canon, “…she simultaneously continues, corrects,
and completes” the canonical texts that she retranslates. 38
Christine, as a translator, continues, corrects, and completes. She
brings regendered texts to the present, asserting her femininity, but
also her equality. These texts are then kept “alive,” to her
contemporary standards, as well as infuse a new “Franco-Italian
vernacular hybridity” within her target culture. 39 As a foreignizing
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element in translation brings aspects of the source language into a
target text and language, so too does Christine in creating her own
kind of ‘woman’s language’ in this hybrid language. Rene
d’Anjou also stresses that: “this bilingual aspect of Christine’s new
vernacular canon is extended and monumentalized.” 40 Christine’s
language is not only unique, it is monumental. As the only woman
in an all-male canon who speaks in an invigorating gendered
hybrid-bilingual language, Christine is not only able to maintain
her femininity but go beyond. Christine most certainly does not
become a man but, greater than an Other, becomes a creator—
becomes a genius.
Letitia Landon faces the same problem of Otherness but is
also able to transcend. Landon, using poetry as her profession,
must embrace the dual nature of the poetess. She is ‘forced,’ as the
imitational side of poetess would imply, to ‘misread’ her
predecessors and write about romance and sensuality. A criticism
by many of her contemporaries was of her focus on these notions
of romance and sensuality. But, Blain writes, “Men as well as
women rushed to read her, drawn in by the titillation of the halfveiled subject matter as much as by the mellifluous verbal skills so
effortlessly displayed. She was a nineteenth-century ‘performance
poet’…” 41 Landon indeed performs—putting on a show in her
words—but only to sell her work. As a ‘poetess,’ she would not be
able to sell poems on surface subjects tackled by ‘true’ poets like
Keats, Byron, or Shelley. She would not be able to sustain
professionalism. Instead, she became “…a true poet whose work
subverts her cultures reading of femininity through a technique
identified by Irigaray as that of exaggerated mimesis.” 42 Instead of
becoming man by becoming Byron or Shelley, she uses her
femininity as only a woman could: by creating poetry as a kind of
“peepshow” for cultural critique.
Underneath her words lies the true language of Letitia
Landon. This notion of the dual notion of poetess in Landon—the
‘puppet’ versus the ‘real agent’ is exemplified in her poem “Love’s
Last Lesson.” The narrator asks for forgetfulness of a lover who
40
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has left her tortured. Superficially, the poem relates this
heartbreaking. Underneath the words however, lies the meaning
that the poem is more about self-expression and language than
love. Landon writes, “I loved unconsciously: your name was
all/That seem’d in language, and to me the world/Was only made
for you;…” 43 The love within her was placed through the
language of the lover. By articulating her own words, by finally
speaking for herself, the narrator is able to begin to forget. This
mess inside of her, her ‘heartbreak,’ is the language of the
patriarchy—a false language that has left her bereft. She must
learn “love’s last lesson”: creation of the self in self-expression, in
subjectivity. The narrator must write her lover down on paper and,
throwing him away, maintain her own identity from words. On the
surface, the poem is about a lost love; below, the poem reveals that
in the creation of your own language, woman can shed the
patriarchy that has forgotten her.
Thus, L.E.L.’s language is one of translation of the self and
all women into words. Landon writes as if the Other and gives a
superficial perspective of Otherness in order to sell her poetry.
But, when ‘stripping’ away her language, Landon invaginates
canonical male poets’ texts to allow for genealogically political
progress. Her texts give the means for a retranslation of female
characters like Byron’s Astarte into speaking subjects.
Furthermore, her poems extend the notion of a language of
‘exaggerated mimesis.’ Even Landon’s superficial language plays
a role in identity as that of a foil. In a time period still greatly
influenced by Rousseauian gender practices, woman would not ‘be
able’ to truly read accomplished male poets. In Landon’s
“exaggerated mimesis” she reveals this notion by often
‘mistranslating’ her predecessors. “Love’s Last Lesson” begins:
“Teach it me, if you can –forgetfulness!” 44 compared to Byron’s
Manfred: “‘What wouldst thou with us, son of mortals—
say?’/Manfred: ‘Forgetfulness—’” 45 Landon ‘misreads’ the
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Byronic need for forgetting a terrible deed and replaces it with
forgetting, what would seem, a childishly over-passionate love
affair. Landon however, manipulates mistranslation in order to
successfully use the poem to create her own language. She
‘penetrates’ the canonized male texts and ‘withdrawals’ a language
for femininity. She, like Christine, uses genealogy to ascend into a
canon of men. Yet, in creating her own language and retranslation
of these canonized poets, Landon emphasizes her uniqueness and,
in this transcendence, attains feminine genius.
To return to Bloom’s essay Antithetical Criticism: An
Introduction, Christine de Pizan and Letitia Landon successfully
use clinamen 46 and tessera 47 to genealogically retranslate
canonized authors. “In the movement of tessera, the precursor is
rescued from his supposed incompleteness. He is regarded as not
having gone far enough, rather than having fallen in the wrong
direction.” 48 The canonized precursors, often forgetting or
silencing woman, are incomplete. Instead, Christine and Landon
are not only able to transcend this male canon, they are able to
create their own woman’s language—initiating an original and
unprecedented advance in their time. Because of this, they are able
to transcend the male canon and, in doing so, attain a notion of
feminine genius promulgated by Julia Kristeva. Kristeva writes
that feminine genius is: “…the flourishing of the individual in his
or her uniqueness, to what makes an individual who he or she is
and raises him or her above ordinariness—genius being the most
complex, the most appealing, and the most fruitful form of this
uniqueness at a particular moment in history and, given that it is
so, the form that is lasting and universal.” 49 Landon and Christine
creatively challenge the sociohistorical conditions of their
identities and, with innovative uniqueness, are able go beyond the
patriarchy. They become women no longer Others but something
greater—the unique “only female member of a male canon”—who
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speak a pure language that does not cling to the past but breaks
free from the shackles of the patriarchy and embraces the woman’s
present.
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Do Russians and
Americans View
Space in the Same
Way?
Evgeny Makarov
Moscow State Linguistic University

We live in civilization.
There is no breaking away from it.
Here everything is in language
and through language.
- Alexander Zinoviev The Yawning Heights

There is a fundamental truth in this passage; human language
is, indeed, a highly complex system which embraces the world in a
way nothing else does. No society would be possible without
language and any social activity is linguistic in its essence. Thus it
is in language that the objective answers to the questions facing the
humanities are to be looked for. If everything is in language,
success here depends just on how keen we are on finding those
answers.
Languages are mediators of ideas. They mediate ideas
differently because their categories do not fully coincide. It seems,
however, that all languages are equally suitable for

communication, meaning that, if a conceptual category does not
have a linguistic correlate, there is a more general linguistic
category to cover this function and, if some category does not
exist, there is no need for it to exist because its functions are
performed by other categories. Thus, Russian, unlike English, has
no articles but the functions the article performs in English are
performed in Russian by word order or by lexical means.
This paper looks at how the range of conceptual categories of
space is reflected in the categories Russian and English operate. It
is important to make a distinction between coordinate and
categorical spatial relations. The former include distance, speed of
motion and size, and are mostly processed by the right hemisphere.
Their representations involve numerical specifications rather than
linguistic categorization. The latter, on the contrary, are mostly
processed by the left hemisphere, require to be categorized in
languages and are the exclusive focus of this paper.
To locate a target object, called the figure, reference to
another object, called the ground, needs to be established. Two
basic kinds of relations between the figure and ground are possible:
contiguity and displacement. When the figure and ground are
contiguous a topological relation is established. Topological
relations are most often coded in language by means of spatial
prepositions, at being the most obvious example, whose meaning
is any kind of contiguity. Both Russian and English can specify all
the major types of contiguity. Thus, superadjacency (on the
horizontal plane) and attachment (on the vertical plane) are
prototypically coded by на in Russian and on in English;
containment is coded by в and in, respectively; penetration is
coded by через and сквозь in Russian as opposed to through in
English; subadjacency is coded by под and under. However, the
difference lies in the fact that specification is always required in
Russian whereas in English it is often enough to gloss contiguity
by at.
It is also important to remark on the following: Russian
favors prepositions prototypically denoting superadjacency or
attachment while English favors containment prepositions. This is
a manifestation of the difference in the conceptual coding of space
between Russian and English. In an earlier paper we argued that,
unlike Russian, English operates the conceptual metaphor
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MOVEMENT IN SPACE IS MANIPULATION OF SOLID
OBJECTS, where space was for the first time described as a target
metaphorical domain. Metaphorical objects have metaphorical
borders, delimiting a kind of “personal space” which alien objects
must not enter. Since borders surround (metaphorically) spaces, the
latter are perceived as containers. It is exactly for this reason that
English tends to represent contiguous spaces as closed, even when
they have no physical borders. Hence the English equivalents for
the Russian на улице, на дереве, на картине are in the street, in
the tree, in the picture. In Russian, a reverse tendency can be
observed: contiguous spaces are represented as open, even when
they do have physical borders. Hence the Russian equivalents for
the English in the post office, in the linguistics department, in the
railway station are на почте, на кафедре лингвистики, на
вокзале.
Since topological relations are very abstract they seem likely
to be cross-linguistically universal. However, considerable
diversity in the kinds of topological relations has been revealed in
recent studies. Thus, it has been pointed out that the Mayan
language Tzeltal features a closed class of dispositional adjectives
that provide for far more detailed specifications than the
prepositions mentioned above; Makah has suffixes encoding
locations such as “at the rear of a house,” “at the base of an upright
object,” “at the head of a canoe”: Karuk has an unlikely suffix –
vara meaning “in through a tubular space”. As these examples
show, attention has generally been turned toward exotic languages
and away from similar phenomena observed in languages like
English and Russian. For example, in English there are a number
of prepositions starting with the once-prefix a- denoting extremely
specific locations and positions: aboard (“at a ship”, now extended
to “at a public transportation means”, such as a plane, bus or train,
but not a car), astride (“with one’s legs on either side of”), atop
(“at the top of”), to name but a few.
When the figure and ground are displaced or disproportionate
it is not enough to establish a topological relation. A projective
relation is needed, i.e., an indication of the direction from the
ground, in which to search for the figure. To specify a direction,
we need a coordinate system, or frame of reference, and it has been
established that languages use just three types of reference frames.
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When the figure and ground are disproportionate, the latter has to
be partitioned and an axis has to be projected from its center to a
designated part, as in The boy is in the back of the car. This kind of
coordinate system is called the intrinsic frame of reference because
it relies on reference to the inherent or intrinsic parts of the ground.
The intrinsic frame is cross-linguistically by far the most
widespread of coordinate systems.
In both English and Russian part assignment within the
intrinsic frame uses the canonical orientation of the artifact,
determined by the leading facet in typical motion (the front of a
truck – передняя часть грузовика), the facet with a perceptual
apparatus (the front of a camera – передняя часть камеры), the
characteristic orientation of the object to the user (the front of
a blackboard – передняя часть доски), or of the user to the object
(the front of a desk – передняя часть стола). If an artifact has no
canonical orientation, part assignment occurs within the relative
frame of reference.
It is common for both English and Russian to describe
locations within the intrinsic frame of reference in terms of human
body parts, employing the conceptual metaphor GROUND IS
BODY; GROUND PARTS ARE BODY PARTS. This kind of
representation is somewhat more common in English, but the main
difference between the two languages here is in the choice of body
parts. Consider, for instance, the following expressions: the eye of
a hurricane (needle, potato), the nose of an airplane, the mouth of
a cave, the head of a nail, the neck of a guitar, the arms of a river,
the hands of a clock, the foot of a mountain, as opposed to шляпка
гвоздя, рукава реки, хвост поезда, подножие горы. As it
follows from the analysis of a number of instances, English favors
facial or upper parts of the body, which are inward and focus on
the personality, whereas Russian tends to choose lower parts or
elements of apparel, including clothes and accessories, which can
be viewed as extensions of the body but are outward rather than
inward.
When the figure and ground are displaced, the relative and
absolute frames of reference are used. Unlike the binary intrinsic
frame, requiring only figure and ground to operate, they are ternary
(except when cardinal directions are used): they also require
information about the spatial disposition of a third participant
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outside the figure/ground dyad, namely the viewpoint. The relative
frame of reference projects the bodily axes of the viewer, front and
back, left and right, onto the ground to specify the figure’s
location, as in The boy is to the left of the house (i.e., on the
speaker’s left). The absolute frame of reference, unlike the two
other frames, uses abstract, antecedently fixed bearings such as the
cardinal directions (north – south/east – west) (the only possibility
for Indo-European languages), fall of land (uphill –
downhill/across) (Tzeltal), coastline (landward – seaward/parallel
to the coast), river flow (upriver – downriver/away from – towards
the river). Absolute systems of reference are the only type to
sustain full logical inferences under different viewpoints but the
costs of absolute computation are higher because it requires a
significant cognitive overhead.
Like most other Indo-European languages, English and
Russian use all three mentioned frames and seem to have a
preference for the relative frame unless there are specific
conditions provoking the use of either the intrinsic or absolute
frame. However, the question would remain if their frequencies of
occurrence are the same in English and Russian until we carried
out a series of experiments to answer it. It has emerged that
English (at least, its American variety) relies on the absolute frame
far more heavily than Russian by often preferring the cardinal
directions. Here is a sample of how a spatial scene is coded in
American English in absolute terms:
I leave the house and walk north about one block to
Speedway Boulevard. Then I cross Speedway and walk about 100
feet to the bus stop. I take the bus west about 6 miles which takes
about 25 minutes. I get off the bus at Speedway Boulevard and
Cherry Avenue by the university. Then I walk west one block and
then cross Speedway once again. Then I walk two blocks south and
turn on 1st. I walk west again one block and then go my building.
Our Russian respondents described similar scenes by using
the relative terms справа and слева to explain position and
направо and налево to explain direction. Both Russian and
American descriptions gave distances and times, but Russian
descriptions also referred to additional grounds. One gets the
impression that Russian speakers do not merely pursue the aim of
stating directions, but also describe the environment, providing
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details that would seem irrelevant to an American speaker. Here is
an example:
Я обхожу свой дом, при этом он остается слева; выхожу
из метро по ходу поезда; после выхода из метро иду по
направлению к пешеходному переходу; сначала по левой
стороне будет невысокое здание белого цвета, потом
маленькие магазинчики; слева будет небольшой ресторан на
первом этаже старого жилого дома; здание справа от меня, в
глубине.
This linguistic difference cannot but have strong cognitive
consequences. English speakers create a fairly accurate mental
map based on cardinal directions. This requires them to calculate
such directions whenever they go to an unknown area. For Russian
speakers, objects of the environment and their mutual dispositions
are more important because memorizing them allows imbedding
themselves into that environment and describing it in relative
terms.
A question arises: what caused American, but not Russian,
speakers to use cardinal directions so extensively? Although we do
not have a ready answer, we can assume that cardinal directions
became important in English when England became a maritime
nation. A marine environment gives one nothing to rely upon but
the compass and environmental clues such as the sun.
The ability for absolute orientation was inherited by the
USA. A possible explanation of the tenacity of cardinal point
orientation in the USA may lie in its history of westward
expansion, which required Americans to constantly monitor and
register directions. The rectangular state division in the USA may
be a variety of a mnemonic technique that facilitated orientation in
the open, unbounded space that surrounded American colonists.
Extra evidence of this comes from the fact that cardinal point
orientation has been shown to be more common in the West and
Midwest than in the thirteen original states.
The rectangular or square structure is no less common for
American towns and villages, i.e., for rural America, where vast
territories had to be clearly and definitely demarcated. It is not to
be wondered at, then, that the compass directions of the main
streets of cities and towns are known to virtually all Americans
from the map. Other directions can be calculated from a primary
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direction, the task made easier by the right angles at the
intersections. Many names of American streets and highways also
contain cardinal direction specifications, so that the average U.S.
citizen has a striking command of the ‘practical’ geography of their
immediate and outer surroundings, but the same average American
will be noted for an astonishing inability to learn foreign
geography, where names rather than directions have to be
memorized.
A final point to be made here is that we have concentrated on
the frames of reference on the horizontal plane for the simple
reason that they usually coincide along the vertical dimension. If a
flag waves above a building, it does so within all three frames: it is
located within the region that radiates from the top of the building
(intrinsic frame); it is higher than the building from the observer’s
point of view (relative frame); and it is higher than the building
along the vertical axis defined by gravity (absolute frame).
Apart from topological and projective relations, there is a
special kind of spatial reference called spatial deixis. Deixis is
generally understood in linguistics and pragmatics as reference by
means of an expression whose interpretation is relative to the
extralinguistic context of the utterance (in the case of spatial
deixis, the location of a participant in the speech event, typically
the speaker). Spatial deictic expressions in English and Russian
include demonstrative pronouns (this – that, these – those; этот –
тот, эти – те), deictic adverbs (here – there; здесь/тут – там), and
deictic verbs of motion or transfer (come – go, bring – take – fetch,
прийти – уйти, принести – унести). These are binary divisions
based on whether motion or transfer proceeds in the direction
toward the speaker (hither) or away from the speaker (thither). In
English, there exist two corresponding sets of verbs; in Russian,
the distinction is coded by deictic prefixes при-, под(о)-, у-, от(о)and some others added to deixis-neutral verb roots. Derivational
prefixes of the kind can be added to virtually any verb root that can
be interpreted as involving either a physical or metaphorical
movement vis-à-vis the speaker in much the same way as
prepositions or prepositional adverbs can be added to most English
verbs to form phrasal verbs (cf. Он подошел поближе – He came
up closer, Пришла зима – Winter has set in, Он ушел от нас/из
жизни – He has passed away).
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It is important to note that deictic references in English are
far more rigidly defined by the speaker’s position than in Russian.
Consider the following example: two Americans are talking and,
when they are about to say goodbye to each other one of them
says, ‘When you go home, please send me an email’, meaning
‘once you are back home’. If we tried to render this perfectly
simple sentence into Russian we would get «Когда ты
придешь/приедешь/вернешься домой, отправь мне email».
English, therefore, does not allow the speaker to shift the deictic
center to any point other than where they are physically located,
whereas the Russian tendency to portray spatial scenes in fine
detail we have mentioned earlier clearly prevails here as well. Here
is another example to demonstrate this difference: a football
commentator is giving a running commentary on a fast-moving
game which is shown by a different camera every few seconds, and
is referring to one of the players as ‘this, no that, player’,
correcting himself once the view and the player’s position on the
screen in relation to the viewer change. This change would not find
a manifestation in the speech of a Russian commentator and a
correction of the kind would instead lead to ambiguity in
interpretation (a plausible reading is that he now means a different
player).
A final point we would like to make in regard to spatial
representation in English and Russian concerns the way motion
proper is described, a point almost entirely neglected in the
existing literature. It stands to reason that both languages possess a
few modal categories to specify the manner of motion, but they do
it differently. It may be necessary, for example, to specify the
transportation means, for which Russian has a whole set of
specific verbs: идти (пешком) – ехать – лететь – плыть, etc.,
whereas English mostly uses just two verbs, to go and,
interestingly, to travel, unless further specification is pragmatically
relevant.
It may also be necessary to specify whether motion is
unidirectional or omnidirectional and this distinction is manifested
in most Russian verbs of motion through the category of the
number of directions, as in идти – ходить, ехать – ездить,
плыть – плавать, etc. These verbs have two fully independent
conjugational paradigms. The verbs идти, ехать, плыть, etc.
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denote unidirectional, purposeful motion, while the verbs ходить,
ездить, плавать, etc. denote recurrent or habitual actions
involving motion. Compare the following: Я иду в театр (сейчас,
вечером, завтра). / I am going to the theater (now, tonight,
tomorrow) (an action proceeding at the moment of speaking). Я
(обычно, часто, иногда) хожу в театр. / I (usually, often,
sometimes) go to the theater (a repeated action in the present).
Now let us look at how these verbs are used with reference to past
actions. Я шел в театр. / I was going to the theater (a background
action in a narrative). Я ходил в театр (вчера, раньше). / I
went/used to go to the theater (yesterday, before) (either an
accomplished action in the past involving going to the theater and
back, or an action repeated in the past but probably not any more).
It follows from these examples that English does not feature the
number of directions category but provides for this distinction by
means of the more generally applied aspectual paradigms as well
as lexically.
We have thus summed up some of our findings about how
Russian and English represent space. We hope to have shown that
they do not always do it in the same way and that the unearthed
differences should have an impact on further linguistic and
epistemological research, on teaching Russian or English as a
second language, translation, interpreting, discourse analysis and
many other applications.
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“May the Forсe
Be with You:”
The “Animatistic
Minimum” in the
Mythological and
Religious
Consciousness
Kseniya Bychenkova
Moscow State University

When Christian missionaries came to North America
during the epoch of great geographical discoveries, they were
surprised to find out that the native peoples had no concept of the
Western notion of God; the idea of a Supreme Being was
altogether foreign to them and was replaced by the belief in an
invisible, mysterious, and impersonal force inherent in people,
animals, lifeless subjects, filling with itself the world surrounding
the person and causing all his life. The Eskimos name this force
sila (or khila) using a word similar to the Russian word sila, that is
“a force.” The Iroquois call it orenda, among the Algonquin a
different word is used for this force, manitou, which bears the
same meaning. The same force is also known under the name of
wakan or wakanda among the Sioux, poknut among the Shoshone,
yek among the Tlinkit, sgâna among the Haida, and nauala among
the Kwakiutl. But such a belief is not peculiar to the indigenous
peoples of North America, and it may be observed in the internal
areas of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.

The same concept is found among the Malayans as kramat,
among the Indo-Chinese tribes as deng, as megbe among the
African Pygmies, as njama among the tribes of Western Sudan,
and as umoja among the Zulu. In Santa Cruz the word malete is
used; at Saa in Malante all persons and things in which this
supernatural force resides are said to be saka, that is “hot.”
Additionally, among the peoples of Oceania—the Melanesians and
Polynesians—the impersonal force is known as mana. As the
American scholars Robert H. Lowie and Robert. R. Marett both
cogently argued, somewhat similar concepts exist in religious
systems as far apart as the Crow and Iroquois of America and the
Ekoi of Africa.
It is in Melanesia that the belief in an impersonal force was
studied for the first time. The English ethnographer and missionary
Robert Codrington was the first to describe in detail the belief in
mana. His book The Melanesians appeared in 1891 and, after it
had been recognized that all of the above mentioned terms are the
exact equivalent of the Melanesians’ mana, this name was
introduced by Robert Marett in 1915 as a common term to denote
all the variations of an impersonal force represented in different
non-Western religions.
According to Codrington mana is a supernatural power of
influence belonging to the region of the unseen. He writes: “This is
what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary
power of men, outside the common processes of nature, it is
present in the atmosphere of life, attaches itself to persons and to
things, and is manifested by results which can only be ascribed to
its operation. When one has got it he can use it and direct it, but its
force may break forth at some new point.” 1 The life and social
position of every person are supposed to depend on mana. He
becomes a chief by the virtue of mana. If a man is successful in
fighting it means that he has got mana. If his pigs multiply and
gardens are productive, it is not because he is industrious but
because the stones in his garden are full of mana.
The French sociologist Emile Durkheim, describing the
beliefs of the Native American tribes and especially the Sioux,
writes that the force wakan “is not a definite and definable power,
1
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the power of doing this or that; it is a power in absolute sense, with
no epithet of determination of any sort. The various divine powers
are only particular manifestations and personifications of it; each
of them is this power seen under one of its numerous aspects.” 2
Taking the words in a larger sense, one may say that it is the god
adored by each totemic cult, however, it is a god in a specific
sense. “Yet,” Durkheim writes, “it is an impersonal god, without
name or history, immanent in the world and diffused in an
innumerable multitude of things.” 3
As a rule, mana is perceived as something ambiguous,
ambivalent; it cannot be considered only useful or only harmful to
the person. However, sometimes it is supposed to be only nocuous,
as, for example, arunkult among the Australian tribe aranda or
onim among the Papuans of New Guinea.
Robert Marett and Bronislav Malinovsky consider the
belief in an impersonal force, or, animatism, as historically the first
form of religious consciousness and, moreover, as “a minimum of
religion” in general, which is kept by all later religions. To
delineate a belief in impersonal forces Marett suggested the taboomana formula which was also adopted by him for his own
minimum definition of religion. He defined this kind of belief by
the term “animatism” to distinguish it from what Edward B. Taylor
called “animism,” that is a belief in supernatural beings.
As to the objections pointing out that people of primitive
societies are unable to suggest any abstract concept of the
impersonal force Durkheim writes that they do not represent this
force in an abstract form, on the contrary, under the influence of
some causes they have been led to conceive it under the form of an
animal, or of vegetable species, or, in a word, of a visible object.
The fact that mana can be embodied in different objects
and can be conveyed from one possessor to another, flowing
through every living and nonliving thing keeping its magic
properties, has led the German scholar K. Oberhuber to conclude
that it has a totemic origin, and, in Durkheim’s opinion, “totemism
is the religion, not of such and such animals or men or images, but
of an anonymous and impersonal force found in each of these
2
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beings but not to be confounded with one of them. No one
possesses it entirely, and all participate in it. It is so completely
independent of the particular subjects in whom it incarnates itself,
that it precedes them and survives them.” 4
In this connection it seems to me, that the idea of
impersonal force has become one of the major archetypes of
mythological and religious consciousness, or, so to speak, “an
animatistic minimum,” whose presence in culture and spirituality
of the subsequent millennia has manifested itself in a wide range—
from a level of household and ceremonial magic up to a level of
deep philosophical thoughts and concepts.
The presence of this archetype in polytheism is proven by
the Sumerian concept of me, a powerful mysterious force operating
the world of gods and people and, like mana, capable of
incarnating itself in different objects. The meaning of the word me
is similar to that of the Sumerian verb of existence me (“to be”);
actually, it is the same word. It is remarkable, that the Indo-Iranian
name of the magic force maya has taken its origin in the verb mаn
(“to think”), and the second part of the word, -ya, whatever
etymology it has, is associated with the old Indian verb ya (“to
go”). The German linguist Wilhelm Humboldt writes that the
radical ya- is actively used in word-formation. In this case, maya
may be understood as a movement of the thought.
It is curious that a lot of terms used by different cultures to
denote an impersonal force has the phoneme m either at the
beginning of the word (malete. mana, manitou, maya, me, megbe)
or in the middle of it (kramat, njama, umoja). The Algonquin’s
manitou is consonant with the Melanesians’ mana, which in turn
completely coincides with a word from one of the Near-Eastern
texts written in the Mandean language in 400 A.D. and containing
the following phrase: “I swear by the great Mana.” In this context,
the term Mana is supposed to have originated in the abovementioned verb man (“to think”). Of course, these facts are no
more than mere coincidences, but they deserve to be mentioned
here.
Just like the Sumerian term me combining the meanings of
a noun and a verb, the word mana is both a noun substantive and a
4
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verb; a transitive form of the verb, manag, manahi, managi, means
to impart mana, or to influence with it. Codrington writes: “An
object in which mana resides, and a spirit which naturally has
mana, is said to be mana, with the use of the verb; a man has
mana, but cannot properly be said to be mana.” 5
In my opinion, similar word usage can be found among the
Algonquin. According to the Christian priest father Alluets, in
1670 he was allowed into a remote Algonquin village in which
white men had never been seen before. The Algonquin were
amazed to see his white skin and black attire and took him neither
for a human being, nor for a deity, but for an embodiment of the
divine force manitou. He was invited to come into a wigwam
where he was surrounded by several old Indians. One of them
came nearer to the priest with two handfuls of tobacco, which
many Native American tribes used for sacrifice, and addressed him
with the following words: “It is very good, Black Dress, that you
have visited us. Manifest your favour to us. You are Manitou. We
shall give you some tobacco.”
The archetypal significance of the belief in an impersonal
force may be proven by the factor of historical succession. Under
the influence of Sumerian beliefs, the Elamic concept of the magic
force kiten inherent in deities has arisen. The Akkadian concept of
the tables of destiny has also originated in me.
Similar views and their similar evolution may also be found
among the Indo-Iranian tribes. Like mana which is an ambiguous
force, maya, as has been shown by the French scholar L. Renou, is
also ambivalent. In the Rig-Veda it is said to be, on the one hand,
“supernatural wisdom” or “a magic force of transformations” when
it concerns gods and, on the other hand, “magical charms,”
“deceit” when it concerns demons and enemies. In the Iranian
mythological and poetical tradition the divine entity khvarno, or
pharn, is also ambivalent. As a rule it is supposed to bring riches
and authority to people, however, the notion of “bad pharn” is not
foreign to the Iranians. While possessing mana makes one a chief,
having pharn makes one a king, gives him supreme, imperial
authority. Khavrno is considered both as an impersonal sacral
entity—a sort of impersonal anonymous force—and as a
5
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personified divine character, which also resonates with the belief in
an impersonal force capable of filling with itself different subjects
and objects. It can be possessed by deities and people for whom it,
as well as mana, is embodied in the house, family, health, cattle.
Just like me which can be owned by cities and temples, khvarno
can be incarnated in the settlement, area, and country. The term
pharn shows the same way of the semantic development that the
term me. If the notion of me has produced the tables of destiny,
pharn is perceived as happiness, fate or destiny. As the English
specialist in Zoroastrianism, Mary Boyes points out that khvarena
(one of the forms of the word pharn) is often associated with the
goddess of destiny Ashi. This name in the Zend language
corresponds with the word asha or rta (arta), the latter being
characteristic of Indo-Aryan tribes, meaning the general law, the
natural order of things, which resembles, in essence and
phonetically, the Chinese notion of Тао (“Way”). It seems to me
that asha is to khvarno what Tao is to te: Tao gives rise to things,
and te rears, cultivates, improves them—that is, operates like an
impersonal vital force. Generally speaking, the English equivalent
for te is the word power and the title of the Chinese treatise Tao-te
ching reads in English as The Book of the Way and Its Power.
Pharn taken in the sense of destiny is often compared to the
Greek goddess Tikhe and to the Roman goddess Fortuna.
Therefore, the concept of an impersonal force, when incorporated
into more “developed” religions, is exposed to some
transformations: first this force begins to be perceived as destiny,
and then it is personified in a female image. Maya in the PostVedaic period is not only considered as the illusiveness of life (as
in Vishnuism) which is connected with one of its meanings
displayed in the Rig-Veda (that is, deceit, charms, illusion), but
maya is also identified with a divine woman, sometimes with the
goddess Durga.
I think that the gradual personification of an impersonal
force in a female image may be observed and proven with the use
of linguistic data. The Latin words Fortuna and fors (“a case”), on
the one hand, and the words fortitudo (“force”) and fortis
(“strong”) have originated in the same radical. The name Eva
meaning, in the Semitic languages, “life,” goes back to the
Nostratic radical haju (“a vital force”); it should be added that the
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Nostratic language is the oldest language of the Eurasian continent
which existed before its division into the Indo-European, Semitic,
Altai, and other languages. арии
The Iranian entity khvarno has some features in common
with the force manitou of the Algonquin of North America. One of
the meanings of the term khvarno, “light,” “shine,” correlates it to
sunlight (the Vedaic word svar which is related to the word
khvarno also means “light,” “shine,” “sun”; of the same radical are
the name of the Slavic god of fire Svarog and the Greek word
charisma meaning, first, a special personal quality or power of an
individual making him capable of influencing or inspiring large
numbers of people, and, secondly, a quality inherent in a thing
which inspires great enthusiasm and devotion). In general fire was
one of the major objects of worship among the Indo-Aryan tribes.
It is from fire that khvarno has come into Zarathustra’s mother.
The American ethnographer Lewis Spence, in his book The Myths
of the North American Indians, 6 points out that the Native
American’s “theology” originated in their views of sunlight. Their
initial notions of a divine force were the same that those
characteristic of the primitive peoples of Europe and Asia. The
Native American’s concept of a god was the idea of a great
powerful force residing in the sky and manifesting itself in
sunshine. A connection between the idea of an impersonal force
and the cult of fire can be shown with the above mentioned term
saka (“hot”), meaning a person or thing in which the impersonal
force resides. The Tokhar word muk, meaning “a magic force,” is
paronymous with the Indo-European words meaning “fire,” for
example, with the Latin word ignis.
The archetype of an impersonal force is also present in the
philosophical concepts in which not a personified deity, but an
abstraction, general idea, or impersonal immanent divinity diffused
in the phenomena of the world is declared to be a subject of cult.
Such a theory was developed by the American thinker Ralph
Waldo Emerson. Emphasizing this feature of Emerson’s
transcendental idealism, William James writes, in his work The
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Varieties of Religious Experience, 7 that in America there are many
churches without God that are called ethical societies or moral
unions and in which people worship abstract concepts and general
ideas. This fact, which has become an important feature
characteristic of the American mentality, makes James suggest a
broad interpretation of the term divinity, understanding it as a sort
of general quality. That Americans are inclined to operating
general ideas to a larger extent than their English ancestors is
pointed out by the French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, in his
work Democracy in America. 8 He specifies that this inclination
has been expressed, first of all, in pantheism.
In my opinion, pantheism undoubtedly contains, in a
rudimentary form, the above mentioned “animatistic minimum.”
The dissolution of God in the world bears a close similarity to the
dissolution of an impersonal force in it. According to de
Tocqueville, the spreading of pantheism is accounted for by the
equalizing of conditions under which people live in a democratic
society, which induces them to speculate not of separate facts, but
of all their multitude as a whole and to reduce different
consequences to one reason. People of a democratic epoch
continuously invent abstract words and personify their meanings,
forcing them to act like real persons. Such phrase as, for example,
“the natural course of things demands that the world be governed
by endowments” would be, in de Tocqueville’s opinion, quite
natural for them.
Of course, this enthusiasm for general ideas may partially
be accounted for by contacts of the new and Native Americans. On
the one hand, Christian preachers, trying to adapt local beliefs for
their own concepts of God, have transformed the impersonal force
orenda or wakanda into a personified image of Great Spirit; on the
other hand, American colonists adjoining to the Native American
culture, have apprehended to some extent the beliefs particular to
the Native Americans.
However, a more significant role in forming this inclination
to abstract ideas belongs to the archetype of an impersonal force as
7
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a “minimum of religion” in general. The French sociologist
Raimon Aron sees the cause that has originated clan totemism
based on the belief in an impersonal force in the recognition of the
sacral which appears to be a force borrowed from the collectivity
and surpassing all the individuals. We can draw, thus, a conclusion
that, having turned into an archetype, the idea of impersonal force
starts to cause an effect. It is society that becomes a true object of
worship, it is sociality that embodies in itself an impersonal and
anonymous force identified with divinity.
Perhaps it is this inclination toward general ideas and
abstract concepts that has led George Lucas to the idea of the Force
developed in his Star Wars series. The Force is viewed as a
metaphysical, binding, and ubiquitous power that is behind the Jedi
and Sith monastic orders. Both the Jedi and the Sith use the Force
to gain their power. Jedi Master Obi-Wan Kenobi describes it as
follows: “The Force is what gives a Jedi his power. It’s an energy
field created by all living things. It surrounds us, penetrates us, and
binds the galaxy together.” 9 There are two different views of the
Force among the characters of the Star Wars series and among
admirers of the movie. Some of them think of the Force as a noncorporeal sentient entity that may be capable of intelligent
thought—almost as if it were a sort of Chinese chi—while others
simply consider it something that can be manipulated and used as
though it were a tool.
It is widely recognized that:
The principles of the Force resonate with those of some real
world religions, including the Shinto religion of Japan,
Buddhism, and certain Celtic druidic concepts. The Force is
also supposed to bear a close similarity to the Chinese
notion of qigong, or chi, and the splitting of the Force into
light side and dark sides echoes the concept of Yin and
Yang in Eastern philosophy (though this is not a perfect
translation, as the dark side is considered a force of evil by
the Jedi and this moral duality is not the same as the
Eastern concept). Along with the concepts of Yin and Yang,
the concept of a ubiquitous Force is concurrent to the real
9
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world concept of a Tao or Way, which is said to flow
everywhere in the universe. The concept of the Force also
borrows heavily from Hindu theology, which also
expresses a belief in a unifying Brahman energy that
composes and is a composite of the Universe (and by
extension, God), and can be used for either good or bad. In
fact, this is particularly similar to the concept of the
Potentium and the Unifying Force in that while the power
can be perverted for evil, it ultimately leads only to a
conclusion that is good. A connection is drawn to
Zoroastrianism with the duality of the Force. The
dichotomy between Ahura Mazda (the One God) and
Angra Mainyu/Ahrima (the evil spirit) is nearly identical to
the concept of the light and dark sides of the Force. . . .
Generally speaking, the Force is considered as an
amalgamation of many religions and philosophies, and is
intended as a metaphor for spirituality itself. 10
It is strange, however, that the concept of an impersonal force,
mana, is not mentioned in the numerous lists of beliefs which this
idea is supposed to resonate with.
In my opinion, it is not with chi or any other abovementioned phenomenon but with mana that the Force has many
traits in common. Let us compare what has already been said of
mana to what is known about the Force. Obi-Wan Kenobi’s
definition of the Force is somewhat similar to the above quoted
definition of mana suggested by Robert Codrington. Like mana the
Force works to affect everything which is beyond the ordinary
power of men: it is present in the atmosphere of life, and attaches
itself to persons and to things, flowing through every living thing.
It partially exists inside the life forms that use it, and draws energy
from their emotions.
The Force is ambivalent, it is divided into two aspects: the
light side and the dark side. These aspects are concerned with the
moral compass of the Force in its various manifestations. The light
side of the Force is the facet aligned with good, benevolence, and
healing, while the dark side of the Force was the element aligned
10
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with fear, hatred, aggression, and malevolence.
The Force is also divided into two more aspects: the
Unifying Force, which essentially embraces space and time in its
entirety, and the Living Force, which deals with the energy of
living things. This refers us to the combination of a natural order
and impersonal force which is characteristic of many religions and
is represented as has already been shown in the notion of asha and
khvarno or Tao and te.
It is important to note that a major property of the
impersonal force with an important archetypal significance is its
fluidity, liquidity which enables it to be poured in the world and
allows one to associate it with water. Additionally, the English
word force means both “power” and “a waterfall” or “a cascade.”
The concept of mana has been developed by the islanders living
among oceanic waters. The Sumerian force me resides at the
depths of the underground ocean of fresh waters Absu, a secret
place which is inaccessible even for gods. Only goddess Inanna
has managed to steal me from the owner of Abzu, god of wisdom
Enki. One of main objects of worship among the Indo-Iranians,
alongside with fire, was water. In Zend it is spoken of khvarno
hidden at the depths of waters. To the Ocean which has a lot of
names depending on what coast it washes, Emerson compares the
Spirit generating everything in the world and getting in its different
manifestations the names of Love, Truth, or Good. If the person
departs from these coasts, he will be deprived of power and
support and his being will get narrower and narrower. Here, we
can draw one more parallel with the religion of Zend. The concept
of asha or rta is multiple-valued: with respect to the world of
things it is a sort of natural order, and in an ethical sense it means
in principle what Emerson speaks of. And at last as Luke
Skywalker says in the Star Wars, “The Force is a river from which
many can drink, and the training of the Jedi is not the only cup
which can catch it.”
So, the basic properties of an impersonal force are its sacral
character, impersonality, liquidity, and ambivalence. It is curious,
that if combining the initial letters of these words, we will get the
Russian word sila, that is “a force.”
The above mentioned facts show that the old beliefs in an
impersonal force are present in later religions as an archetype
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defining many important components of mythological and
religious consciousness and even of social consciousness as a
whole.
The well-known phrase from the Star Wars series “May the
Force be with you” is not only the quintessence of the Jedi’s
religion, but also the apotheosis of the archetypal being of the idea
of an impersonal force in the modern world.
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Radio as a Tool
of the State:
Radio Moscow and
the Early Cold War
Mark D. Winek
American University

Scanning the airwaves, all that could be found was static.
And then, one minute before the hour, through the disturbance
came the notes of “Moscow Nights”. Perhaps elsewhere the Cold
War was frigid and stale, but here, over high frequency radio, the
Cold War was hot. Radio Moscow played a leading role in that hot
war over the airwaves – just as much as the Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty. Yet, very little has
surfaced in the West regarding the role of Radio Moscow in the
Cold War. My paper works to analyze this significant player in the
battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. I explore
the organization and programming of Radio Moscow and its
connection to the Soviet Government. In addition, I seek to
analyze its reception in the United States and, most importantly,
how it was used as a vehicle of Soviet foreign policy around the
world.
Early Broadcasting in Russia (to 1941)
From a very early time, the leadership of the revolutionary
Bolshevik party in Russia recognized the importance of mass
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communication, a point only strengthened after the October
Revolution of 1917. Soon after the creation of the Soviet
Government in Moscow, the Department of Agitation and
Propaganda was set up to coordinate and control all the media
outlets in the nation. 1 While the new government recognized the
importance of newspapers and magazines, they jumped on the new
technology that could spread their word most effectively to a
population spread out over 6.6 million square miles.
Radio would soon have the capacity to spread information
about health, sanitation, and agriculture, as well as the message of
the central government across the vastness of Soviet territory. 2
With Lenin’s message of world revolution, radio could spread the
movement into Europe and Africa. Within two years of the
establishment of a Moscow radio laboratory in 1922, ten stations
were in operation in the Soviet Union. While stations were
allowed to be established by organizations and collectives, radio
broadcasting effectively remained in the hands of the Soviet
government. 3 As the new state evolved, the Soviet leadership
recognized the need for international broadcasting. The creation of
Radio Moscow filled this need. Established in 1929 with French,
English, and German language services, programming expanded
with Swedish, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian,
Czech, and Russian services by 1932. 4 Like domestic
programming, Radio Moscow expounded the successes of the
1917 Revolution and the recent accomplishments of the Soviet
Government.
Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)
By the end of the 1930s, the Soviet Union faced new
challenges on its borders, particularly to the west. Adolf Hitler’s
territorial expansion into Austria, Czechoslovakia and even farther
east was making the Soviet leadership nervous. The Molotov-
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Ribbentrop Pact kept the Germans at bay until the Nazi invasion of
June 22, 1941.
As German forces invaded Soviet territory as a part of
Operation Barbarossa, they entered a country that had experienced
great gains in the radio field. Over 100 broadcast stations were
found across the country. 5 However, the June invasion caught the
Soviet government by surprise, giving the state’s broadcast
apparatus little time to join the war footing. Still, Radio Moscow
managed to establish broadcasting to German-occupied territories
in their own languages early in the war. 6 The increased
broadcasting over distances and construction of new, powerful
stations would serve Radio Moscow well over the war and postwar years.
Though reaching occupied territories as well as the
expanses of Soviet territory with the government’s message was
important, the Soviet leadership recognized the importance of
counteracting German radio. The war of the airwaves was
characterized by premature declarations of victory, reports of
atrocities on the opposing side, and accounts of conditions on the
enemy’s home front. Early in the war, the Germans took the upper
hand over the feeble attempts by Radio Moscow to counteract their
claims. However, by 1942, Moscow had managed to gain listener
trust. As James von Geldern notes, the factors included, “relative
reliability, the willingness to trust listeners to reach their own
conclusions, and improved fortunes of war”. 7
Indeed, the Soviets had gained the upper hand. Though the
Great Patriotic War left nearly 14% of the Soviet population as
casualties, it also left the propaganda apparatus of the Soviet state
in a revitalized condition. Wartime broadcasting boosted Radio
Moscow’s staff to thirteen native broadcasters capable of
producing programming in most European languages. 8 The station
included a strong German language department, particularly useful
in the coming decades of post-war occupation of Germany.
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Finally, technology had been upgraded, providing Radio Moscow
with facilities to reach most of the Eurasian continent. By 1945,
Radio Moscow was broadcasting in 29 different languages. 9

Expansion of International Broadcasting during the Early
Cold War (1945-1965)
While Victory in Europe and later Victory in Japan ended
the shooting war in 1945, another battle was just beginning. The
wartime relationship between the Soviet Union and the western
allies had always been plagued by some mutual mistrust. This
mistrust soon escalated as the occupation of conquered territories
progressed.
To meet the escalation of tensions between the Soviet
Union and the west, Radio Moscow continued to increase its
broadcast capabilities and target populations. The first addition to
Radio Moscow’s language services was Korean in 1946, followed
closely by Uighur and Mongolian. The Korean service became
particularly important with the occupation of the northern half of
the Korean Peninsula by the Red Army and the beginning of the
Korean Conflict in 1951. Language services to the Indian
Subcontinent and South Asia were also added in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. 10
Radio Moscow also expanded many of its preexisting
language services to serve new requirements. At the end of the
1940s, the Arabic service moved from broadcasting 7.5 hours per
week to 42 hours per week, one of Radio Moscow’s largest.
Persian language broadcasting increased to 31.5 hours per week in
1950, and Turkish to 31¼ per week. European language
broadcasts also expanded, however, they tended to favor Western
Europe. Weekly broadcasts in English expanded to 38 hours,
French to 28 hours, and German to 55 hours per week. Italian and
Finnish language services also experienced modest increases.
Surprisingly, weekly broadcasts to Yugoslavia were cut nearly by
half, while broadcasts to Czechoslovakia were completely cut.
9
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Similarly, the end of the 1940s brought a cut of 10 hours from the
Mandarin Chinese service to 14 hours per week. 11
In response to Radio Moscow and other Soviet
broadcasters, the United States also stepped up broadcasting to
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. By 1956, the Voice of
America was broadcasting more than 300 hours per week to the
Soviet Union. Radio Liberation (changed in 1963 to Radio
Liberty) was established in 1951 by the United States to broadcast
to the Soviet Union in Russian and other Soviet languages. It
began with a 20-minute Russian program repeated for 12 hours a
day. By 1957, it had increased to speaking 17 Soviet languages
from 11 transmitters. At the same time, Radio Free Europe began
speaking to Eastern Europe. By 1954, it was broadcasting 124¾
hours a week to Poland alone. 12
These increases in broadcasting hours by both sides began
the Cold War radio battles. As global crises evolved and other
nations joined or left spheres of influence, language services and
their weekly outputs changed to reflect the situation. The
developing African independence movements in the late 1950s and
1960s changed Radio Moscow’s meager African services, adding
Portuguese and 11 African languages, including Somali, Zulu, and
Malagasy. English and French language output for the African
continent was also increased by the end of the decade. 13
Purpose of International Political Broadcasting and Radio
Moscow
In today’s capitalist market, large and small businesses
recognize the need for a public image and dissemination of
information about their services. Many use word of mouth,
billboards, and radio and television spots to inform potential
customers. Likewise, since the beginning of the modern system of
international politics, nation-states have recognized a similar need
to create a good public image around the world. The United
Kingdom uses the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), not only
to serve the needs of the domestic population, but also to
disseminate a British viewpoint over radio, television, and the
11
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Internet to non-British nationals. Newscasts may cover a story in
China, unrelated to the British Isles. However, commentary and
analysis can come from a British perspective, subtly bringing the
audience into the British approach.
Though highly-skewed to the Western ear, Radio Moscow
sought to establish the same relationship with the listener during
the Cold War. By explaining the Soviet perspective of an issue,
the audience could be drawn into Moscow’s outlook. While they
might not have agreed with the opinion, they would now at least
understand Moscow’s position as it related to their own. Thus, the
Soviet system became less intangible and ever so much more
rational.
The creation of borders and barriers to trade among nations
prohibits the flow of personal contact and information. A traveler
or good must be approved to exit and enter a country through a
visa or trade regime. However, radio waves, with the exception of
jamming and atmospheric phenomena, cannot be stopped at the
border. Thus, the medium of radio provides nations with the
ability to speak to peoples of another state without interaction with
the second government. While a government may not be able to
publish an inflammatory document in another country without
diplomatic problems, it may be able to broadcast the information to
the other country without reservation. Radio can bring
international relations from the international summit to the level of
the individual citizen.
Organization and Control of Radio Moscow
Radio broadcasting originating from the Soviet Union
operated on a multilevel system. At the bottom stood local
broadcasters, followed by stations in the various oblasts and krays.
At the top stood the central broadcasting system, under which
Radio Moscow fell.
In 1961, control over of broadcasting in the Soviet Union
was held by the State Committee of Radio and Television
Broadcasting. 14 The Committee itself was a direct part of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR, which became Sovmin after
1946. According to S.V. Kaftanov, Chairman of the State
14
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Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, reported in
1961 that the Committee’s tasks included: illuminating “domestic
and foreign policies of the Communist Party and of the Soviet
government,” “introduction of the radio listeners and television
viewers to the best works of literature, music and to the theatrical
art of the peoples of the USSR,” and “exposing the anti-national
essence of bourgeois ideology, morality and reactionary
propaganda”. 15 By keeping the Committee chairman directly
responsible to the Council of Ministers, the state was able to
maintain control over all news, educational, cultural, and
entertainment programming broadcast over the state apparatus,
including Radio Moscow.
Programming Content: An Hour With Radio Moscow
While a history of the broadcasting service is important, a
dissection of a one-hour broadcast also yields great insight into
Radio Moscow’s role in Soviet policy. Typically, a few minutes
before the hour, an interval signal, usually the popular tune
Moscow Nights, would be broadcast to indicate the beginning of
programming. On the hour, the Kremlin chimes would be heard,
followed by a full news summary. The news summary would
usually take into account domestic events beginning with the
Communist Party, followed by stories from satellite nations, and
condemnations of events in the capitalist world. Following the
news, a feature would be presented, often a musical program or
commentary on current events. Topics often included the life of
the Soviet worker, United States arms policy, or the success of
farm programs in the Soviet republics. Musical programs regularly
highlighted Russian and Soviet composers and artists. 16 Multiple
feature programs were offered throughout the hour, but none
compared with Moscow Mailbag. For 40 years, until his death in
2005, the English-language program was hosted by Joe Adamov
and featured listener questions ranging from the KGB to the artist
of a traditional Russian song. The broadcast would be concluded
with a recap of various program notes and then the cycle would
begin again with Moscow Nights.
15
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News Broadcasting
In the early years of the Cold War, as it had before, Radio
Moscow stuck to a news format. Gayle Durham Hollander
described some of the important topics in news broadcasts:
In 1960, Partiinaya Zhizn indicated the following
major change in procedure: “The central radio
stations in Moscow must first of all ensure timely
broadcasts of important political information,
effective commentary on domestic and foreign
events, the organization of various artistic
programs…Because radio should give the
population the important news before the
newspapers do, TASS has been instructed to
transmit news immediately to central and local
stations.” 17
The “major change in procedure” she describes comes not from the
content of the radio programming, but rather the shift in
responsibility for major stories from the newspapers to radio
stations. Concerning newscasts, Kaftanov described the materials
to be found in news bulletins around 1960:
Materials pertaining to the Seven Year Plan for the
Development of the National Economy of the
USSR occupy a place of importance in all
presentations of “The Latest News”, about the
progress of work towards the fulfillment of that
plan, materials about how the Soviet people are
executing the decisions of the Party and the
government, information on themes dealing with
political, party, Komsomol, and trade union life. 18
News programs generally stuck to the events within the
Communist Party first, then those stories that exemplified Soviet
17
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activities around the world, other socialist movements, and events
in the Warsaw Pact nations.
Though well past the early Cold War years of the 1950s
and 1960s, the newscast of July 1, 1985 provides evidence as to
how the Soviet Union portrayed itself over its global mouthpiece.
Headlines lead with information about the full session of the
Central Committee, followed by details of the meeting of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Next, a story about the
condemnation of the U.S. ‘Star Wars’ defense plan, a project
particularly detested by Moscow, by an international group of
physicians. Subsequent stories touched upon another mass
meeting in Greece condemning American deployment of missiles
to Europe and continuing problems following the Union Carbide
disaster in Bhopal, India.
The major global story of the day concerned the release of
39 American hostages from TWA Flight 847. However, the only
remote reference to the story was in Radio Moscow’s description
of U.S. negotiations with the French concerning terrorism, which it
described as an attempt at, “military action against a number of
sovereign nations and national liberation movements”. 19
Likewise, it played down the removal of Grigori Romanov from
the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, regarded by many
to be Mikhail Gorbachev’s major rival. Instead, it stated that he
was, “retiring on pension on account of his health”. 20 In this way,
news briefings were strictly controlled to follow the official
government line.
In addition to hourly newscasts, Radio Moscow presented
news magazines and special interest commentaries based on
current and historical news stories. In the 1985 broadcast, the
hourly newscast was followed by ’The Way We See It’ A Look at
the Soviet Union and the World, today devoted to contrasting U.S.
missile deployment with Soviet policy. 21 Later commentaries
dealt with survivors of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima visiting
Moscow and thanking the government, “for their tremendous
efforts to ease world tensions” and the denunciation of the United
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States’ negative attitude toward arms negotiations by a British
labor union.
Jamming
In addition to the attention that the Soviet government gave
to its own international broadcasting, another indication of the
medium’s importance came in the government’s active jamming
campaign. In international broadcasting, the act of jamming refers
to one station or power deliberately broadcasting on a frequency
already in use by another station for the purposes of preventing the
signal from being received. While Radio Moscow’s signals were
rarely jammed by other nations, the Soviet Union actively jammed
the broadcasts of Western stations such as the BBC and the Voice
of America. The purpose of this was to prevent Soviet citizens
from being able to tune in the Western broadcasters, fearing
“Western cultural infiltration”. 22 Indeed, they may have had cause
to worry: the Voice of America estimated 8 million Soviet citizens
listened into Western broadcasts.
In response to increased broadcasts directed to the Soviet
Union, a campaign of jamming the Voice of America and the BBC
from an estimated 150 transmitters within Soviet territory in 1949.
While this scale of jamming was effective, it was most certainly
not without cost. U.S. Government estimates in 1950 indicated
that the Soviet Union was spending $17.5 million a year on
jamming, or an amount equal to the Voice of America’s total
budget. Indeed, a U.S. diplomat speculated that the Soviets,
“devoted four times the capital equipment in transmitters and
monitoring stations and ten times the manpower to block Western
broadcasts” following the Voice of America’s increased efforts to
circumvent jamming. 23
Had the Soviet Union not recognized the role that
international broadcasting could play in changing domestic public
opinion (or conversely, the role it could play in changing Western
public opinion), they would not have invested much needed capital
in jamming activities from the end of World War II right up until
1989. The United States also recognized this importance and used
22
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it as a way of tying up Soviet resources in jamming and
international broadcasting.
Reception in the United States
It is important to remember that broadcasting is a two-way
exchange: the broadcaster transmits and the listener must listen to
the signal. With this in mind, what was the reception of Radio
Moscow in one of its major targets, the United States? Don D.
Smith investigated the impact of Radio Moscow’s broadcasts in
the late 1960s. In his article “Some Effects of Radio Moscow’s
North American Broadcasts”, Smith revealed that there was a
“sizable audience”. 24
Operating on the theory that Radio Moscow’s
programming was anti-American and did not meet general
standards of effective communication, Smith still found that
Americans who regularly listened to the programs were, none the
less, influenced by what they heard. In a previous survey of
general shortwave radio listening habits, he discovered that 9% of
the national sample had listened to foreign radio broadcasts within
the last year, with 6% of the sample having specifically listened to
political or news programming. 25 When those indicating a high
interest in international affairs were surveyed, the most mentioned
station was Radio Moscow. 26 Though they recognized that the
information was biased and propaganda-based, they also noted that
such broadcasts were, “useful in (1) making them more aware of
what other countries are thinking about the United States, (2)
giving them additional information about world affairs, and (3)
telling the other side of the story”. 27 The majority of this audience
was made up of male professionals and those with at least some
college education. 28
In the case of Smith’s Radio Moscow study, he found that,
despite the listening population’s biases about the content of
broadcasts, their direction of opinion consistently changed to favor
24
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Moscow’s line. Seventy percent of the experimental group had
their views toward the Soviet Union and Moscow’s policies
change for the better, especially those who had held very negative
views to begin. 29 One participant commented that the broadcasts
made them see that the Soviet Union was not just some, “’monster
with atomic bombs in each hand; instead they’re human, as
concerned with human affairs as we are’”. 30
However, in one of his final conclusions, Smith remarked
that the effectiveness of Radio Moscow broadcasts could not
completely be attributed to the presentation of information.
The broadcasts seem to have had an effect, not
because of any particular skill in communication,
but because conditions in our own [American]
society had led the audience to hold unrealistic
negative images which, upon actual exposure, were
clearly refuted for many of the listeners. 31
The crux of Smith’s point is that many of the respondents
were affected by the difference in opinions between Radio
Moscow and the American domestic media. As one reply put it,
“’When they [Radio Moscow] say something that is different from
what you read in American newspapers you begin comparing, and
sometimes what they say makes more sense’”. 32 Many of those
who reported an unexpected change for the better in their opinion
of the Soviet Union based on Radio Moscow broadcasts also
reported that American media played a role in this change. Their
attention to shortwave broadcasts from the Soviet bloc exposed
them to other sources, which, on occasion, they found to be
credible or even more reasonable than what the American media
was saying.
In terms of strictly technical reception in the United States,
it is impossible to say how strong signals were received during the
1950s and 1960s. Quality of shortwave signals is subject to a host
29
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of variables, including transmitting power, atmospheric conditions
(including weather), local terrain, and interference from other
stations on nearby frequencies. There are indications that Radio
Moscow’s North American Service was consistently available
throughout the Continental United States, as reported by various
newspapers, university researchers, and regular listeners. 33
While Radio Moscow’s in-house surveys have not yet
surfaced, the audience research of the major American
broadcasters has. The period studied by Smith was just the
beginning of larger-scale audience research by the Voice of
America and Radio Liberty. Methodology, and a system by which
to interview travelers from the Soviet Union, was only seriously
worked out by 1970. Until then, Soviet travelers in the West were
interviewed on an ad hoc basis, only allowing basic inferences
about listening habits. 34 However, in the period between 1972 and
1990, the Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research (SAAOR)
unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was able to interview
upwards of 50,000 Soviet travelers in the West and more than
25,000 legal immigrants. 35
The first audience quantification using the system was
between 1970 and 1972, in which SAAOR estimated that the
Voice of America reached 23% and Radio Liberty 11% of the
Soviet adult population weekly. By 1980, the VOA was estimated
to reach 15% and Radio Liberty, 8%. 36 These numbers remained
consistent throughout the 1980s and 1990s for the VOA.
However, Radio Liberty experienced a climb from 7% in 1980 to
10% in 1985. This was followed by a sharp increase in listeners in
1989 to around 17% of the adult Soviet population. 37 This is due
to the cessation of Soviet jamming of the station that had been
constant for decades. Overall, RFE/RL research of listening habits
found that audiences were dominated by urban males between ages
33
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30 and 50, concentrated around Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltics,
and Trans-Caucuses.
While these estimates have been disputed by some, the
statistics still show that there was a far greater audience to Western
radio stations such as the Voice of America and Radio Liberty in
the Soviet Union than there was for Soviet broadcasts in the United
States. Between 1970 and 1970, SAAOR found that the VOA was
reaching around 23% of the Soviet adult population. However,
Smith found that only 9% of the U.S. population listened to
international radio overall, and not one specific station.
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn about Radio Moscow’s use
in the early Cold War? Perhaps the most important thing about
Radio Moscow’s international services was the value placed on
them by the Soviet Government. Even without a budgetary
measure of value, it is apparent that Radio Moscow was a vital part
of the Soviet broadcasting apparatus from the mid-1930s. By
1932, Soviet radio was broadcasting abroad in 11 languages, rising
to 29 by the close of the War. Officials in the Kremlin saw that
shortwave broadcasts were a way to spread Soviet opinion and
views on international affairs and to counteract the influence of the
capitalist system.
The link between the Soviet Government and Radio
Moscow is indisputable – the station was operated by the
government under the State Committee on Radio and Television
Broadcasting, within the central radio broadcasting system. News
broadcasts, a staple of Radio Moscow’s programming since the
Great Patriotic War, were still subject to pre-broadcast censorship
by the government and concentrated on party and government
news.
Finally, though the audience for Radio Moscow’s
broadcasts was rather insignificant in the United States, the station
did manage to reach some of its goals. Though listeners reported
that they did not experience a change of heart regarding the Soviet
Union, they did report that some of their overall opinions had
changed. In the end, the overall listenership to Radio Moscow was
relatively small, seeing as the total nationwide audience for all
international political broadcasting in November of 1966 equaled
112

2% of Americans, or about 2 million people. While listeners
reported one of their top favorites to be Radio Moscow, the
station’s listener base would be significantly less than 2 million,
and thus not drastically altering overall U.S. public opinion. This
is in sharp contrast to the Soviet audience for Radio Liberty and
the Voice of America. However, Radio Moscow’s value outside of
the United States is relatively unknown. Many throughout the
world, particularly in the developing world, tuned in regularly to
Moscow’s broadcasts.
Despite a relatively small group of listeners in the United States
and the role of censorship played in listeners’ opinions, the role of
Radio Moscow in the USSR’s foreign policy apparatus cannot be
underplayed. The attention paid to Radio Moscow by the central
government and its rapid development through the 1930s and
1940s provides compelling evidence for its value to the state. The
station’s broadcasts provided invaluable insight into Soviet life for
Western governments and the general public.
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Tom Stoppard’s
The Coast of Utopia
in Russia:
Cultural Adaptation
Clara Leon
The University of Oregon

Tom Stoppard’s theatrical trilogy The Coast of Utopia (in
Russian Берег Утопии) premiered in London in 2002. Since that
time, it has been performed in New York, and, just recently, in
Moscow at the RAMT, the National Youth Theatre. The last
performance was in the beginning of April 2008. In March, I was
privileged enough to be able to go see the performance. I had
wanted to see the plays on stage ever since I read the trilogy the
year before and it particularly interested to me to see the
performance in Russian. I was curious to discover what Russians
would think of these Tony-award-winning plays which, while
written by an Englishman, have a profoundly Russian subject
matter.
The Coast of Utopia recounts the lives of several early
Russian revolutionaries, among them Alexander Herzen (in
Russian Герцен) and Michael Bakunin, as well as those of their
friends and peers, such as the author Ivan Turgenev and the literary
critic Vissarion Belinsky. Each play runs for about three hours, and
though they are meant to be able to stand alone they work best as a
whole. In Moscow they were always shown together, one after the
next from noon until almost eleven at night.

The first play, Voyage, takes place between 1833 and 1844,
in a variety of places including “Premukhino, the Bakunin estate,” 1
and “Moscow.” 2 Voyage deals mostly with Michael Bakunin’s
youth and his search to find himself through the study of
philosophy, which he does not really understand but cites with
abandon. Finally, Bakunin decides that “revolution is his new
philosophy of self-fulfillment,” 3 thus setting his path to the future.
Belinsky is also important in this play in his attempt to establish
himself as a literary critic. Herzen is also present as a young writer
and activist. In addition, Bakunin’s parents and four sisters play
significant roles.
The second play, Shipwreck, takes place “between 1846
and 1852 at Sokolovo, a gentleman’s estate fifteen miles outside
Moscow; Salzbrunn, Germany, Paris; Dresden; and Nice.” 4 The
most prominent character in this play is Alexander Herzen. The
story recounts the experiences that he and his wife, Natalie,
encounter while living in Western Europe (mainly in Paris), where
they are allowed to go to seek medical aid for their younger son,
Kolya, who is deaf. Herzen spends much time discussing
revolutionary theory and even witnesses firsthand the forming of
the 2nd Republic in France, as well as its fall. Bakunin is also
present in this play; he takes part in the revolutions that Herzen
discusses and eventually is sent to prison in Siberia for this.
Turgenev and Belinsky are present, though Belinsky dies during
the time covered by the play. There are also some characters which
appear only in this play, such as George and Emma Herwegh, a
German revolutionary poet and his devoted wife. The play ends
with Kolya’s tragic death in a shipwreck and the subsequent death
of Natalie. As the play ends, Herzen leaves for England with his
surviving children.
Salvage, the third installment of the trilogy, takes place
between 1853 5 and 1868. 6 In this play Herzen continues to be the
1
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main character and focus. The action follows his efforts to publish
insurrectionary newspapers from abroad, as well as his
complicated family situation, in which for a while he is sharing the
wife of his friend Nicolas Ogarev, (whose name is also Natalie.)
The play ends shortly before his death; the last scene is a dream of
Herzen’s in which Turgenev and Karl Marx are discussing the
future of Russia and that of the world in general.
Due to their complexity, any interpretation of these plays
relies heavily on the reader’s or spectator’s preunderstanding. That
is to say, the way in which the trilogy is appreciated is highly
dependant on the spectator’s level of background knowledge about
the subject. In Richard E. Palmer’s essay “Hermeneuein and
Hermeneia: The Modern Significance of their Ancient Usage,” he
explains hermeneutic preunderstanding as thus:
Explanatory interpretation makes us aware that explanation
is contextual, is “horizonal.” It must be made within a
horizon of already granted meanings and intentions. In
hermeneutics, this area of assumed understanding is called
preunderstanding. One may fruitfully ask what
preunderstanding is necessary in
order to understand
the (given) text. … It might be asked what horizon of
interpretation a great literary text inhabits, and how the
horizon of an individual’s own world of intentions, hopes,
and preinterpretations is related to it. 7
Clearly, not every viewer of Stoppard’s trilogy will
interpret or understand it in the same way. The plays, concerned as
they are with a particular aspect of Russian and European history,
require some familiarity with Russian history, as well as
philosophy and the history of socialism, to be understood. A
viewer whose preunderstanding emphasizes one of these aspects
over another will thus interpret the play differently than someone
whose preunderstanding emphasizes a different aspect. A viewer
who is completely unfamiliar with this era of history may not get
anything from these plays at all.
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One example of this is the difference in comprehension of
one theme in Voyage that my mother and I experienced. She read
the play before I did and found it hard to get through. One thing
that puzzled her was the attestation of certain characters that
Russia has no literature (except for that written by Pushkin.)
In Voyage, the following discussion occurs:
ALEXANDER: … They write better Russian than I do –
what a shame there’s nothing worth reading (over his
daughters’ protests), apart from…
DAUGHTERS: Pushkin!
ALEXANDER: … Pushkin. 8
This theme is reprised several times over the course of the
play, as Belinsky makes it his thesis that, “we have no literature.” 9
He argues that, for the most part, what is published in Russia (in
his era) is an imitation of Western literature and, furthermore, that
should Russia develop its own literary tradition, “literature can
replace, can actually become Russia! It can be greater and more
real than the external reality.” 10 Even in this monologue, though,
he acknowledges that there is, “Pushkin, or Gogol’s new stories,
definitely Gogol, and there’s more to come.” 11 Being, as I am, a
student of Russian literature, this statement makes sense to me. My
mother, though, due to her lack of knowledge of the subject,
remains confused. I understood that the fact that the scene took
place in the 1830’s means that many of the most well-known
Russian authors had not yet begun to write, but she did not.
Likewise, understanding something about the link between
romanticism and the rise of nationalism is key to understanding
Belinksy’s argument that a national literary tradition would create
a new Russia and bring her grandeur, and a short article about this
subject was apparently included in the play’s program when it was
performed in New York to aid the spectators in their appreciation.
But what sort of preunderstanding would a Muscovite
viewer of Stoppard’s trilogy bring to the work? Presumably, the
8
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Russian spectators would better know the historical era. They
would have heard of Herzen and Bakunin and would probably not
need to ask why none of the characters, in their discussions of
Russian literature of the 1830s, were mentioning Tolstoy or
Dostoevsky. But what more would they know? And what would
they think of the whole concept in the first place? Would they be
pleased that an Englishman had taken interest in their history, or
would they feel that it was not his place to write about a foreign
culture in such detail? If Stoppard’s research was flawed, would
they notice? Would mistakes bother them?
Of course, the answers to these questions depend on the
individual spectator. Nonetheless, it seems that Russian audiences
generally like The Coast of Utopia. My host sister in Moscow
affirms that at least Voyage has a Chekhovian feel to it, an opinion
echoed by some critics. “Время в спектакле постоянно
возвращается к каким-то исходным точкам и сюжетам
(излюбленный стоппардовский ‘флэш-бэк’). Для театра такие
сюжеты — ‘чеховский’…” 12 (Time in this show is continually
returning to some initial starting point and subject, Stoppard’s
beloved “flash back.” In theatre, such a “Chekhovian” subject…).
This article from The Banner (Znamya) goes on to point out that
Chekhov’s plays have also been performed on the stage at the
National Youth Theatre and suggests that Stoppard’s trilogy is not
out of place there.
In fact, it seems that many consider The Coast of Utopia
very apt and appropriate to contemporary Russia. An article in
“More Intelligent Life” discusses this:
“What kind of literature and what kind of life is the same
question,” as Belinsky says in the play. It is still the same in
Russia today. Borodin's production has everything to do
with modern Russian life, its ideas and ideals, its
comprehension of the past and contemplation of the
future…Russian state ideologists are hard at work trying to
persuade themselves and the country that democracy and
respect for individual rights and liberty are of no use to its
people, that Russia always prospered when it was ruled by
12
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despotic tsars and that there is nothing in Russian history to
be embarrassed about. The characters have returned to a
country where their dreams about justice and freedom
evoke mostly sneers, whereas Nicholas I, one of Russia's
most senseless autocrats, evokes sympathy and respect. “I'd
love to read an article by Herzen, with his lacerating wit,
about contemporary Russia,” Stoppard says. 13
According to this same article, the spectators after the first
Russian performance argued “not about the merits of the
production, but about what has been said on stage. This surprises
Stoppard: "It is as if people are responding to statements. They
seem to imply that my plays fill some sort of gap-I don't quite
believe it." 14
It’s true that names such as Herzen’s are familiar in Russia,
but the significance of these historical figures was changed during
the Soviet era. The article goes on to say that Isaiah Berlin, who
inspired Stoppard's interest in Herzen, wrote that "the singular
irony of history was that Herzen—who wanted individual liberty
more than happiness, or efficiency or justice, and denounced
organized planning, economic centralization and governmental
authority—was canonized by the Soviet government,” and that
“the Soviet and post-Soviet eras also deformed the language that
expressed those sentiments. Words such as "honor" and "duty"
were first extolled and abused by the Communists then turned into
a joke by their successors. Stoppard's trilogy has not only taken off
layers of bronze paint from Herzen or Belinsky and brought them
back to life, it has rehabilitated their language.” 15
During the rehearsal period for Coast of Utopia, in order to
help the actors understand the characters that they were to play,
Stoppard organized trips to Premukhino, the Bakunin family estate,
and also to Herzen’s hometown, where they cleaned up an old
statue of Herzen and his friend Ogarev, also a prominent character
in Coast of Utopia. Thus, although the actors’ preunderstanding of
13
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the subject may have labeled the trilogy’s heroes as protoMarxists, through their historical exploration and the trilogy itself
they came to see the characters as individuals with their own ideas,
and, most importantly, their own lives. The Znamya article agrees
with this. “По сцене ходят не “портреты”, а живые, милые
люди.” 16 (“Portraits don’t walk out on the stage, but rather living,
likeable people”).
When I went to see the show the theatre was almost full
and the spectators seemed to be enjoying themselves. It seems that
the critics like the plays well enough, too. I would have liked to be
able to interview more individual Russians about their impressions
and opinions, though. As thus, my attempts at understanding The
Coast of Utopia’s place in Russian society is far from complete. I
am eager to learn more and hope to do so soon.
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Students of the
Foreign
1

Nicholas K. Kupensky
Moscow International University

I would like to offer an afterword to this collection of
essays with the hope of briefly conceptualizing these two meetings
of Student-Scholars and offering some suggestions on how to
approach student-scholarship from a foreign point of view.
First of all – what is a Student-Scholar? To being with, the
very notion of a “student-scholar” or “student-scholarship” is a
contradiction in terms in its combination of two seemingly
diametrically opposed concepts. At first glace, we could define
this difference between what either party knows. We are able to
recognize Scholars because they possess knowledge that is
“authorized,” “professional,” and “intellectually mature” in
contradistinction to the Student’s knowledge, which is
“unauthorized,” “amateurish,” intellectually “childish,” or “naïve.”
In fact, one Ivy League graduate school locates the very point at
which a Student transitions into a Scholar by stating that the Ph.D.
dissertation “heralds your transformation from a consumer to a
producer of knowledge.” Thus, the authorization of Students to
call themselves Scholars occurs through the academic practices of
completing graduate programs, publishing in professional journals,
1
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reviewing the research of one’s peers, presenting research at
professional conferences, keeping in mind all the while that these
rites of passages are controlled and supervised by an academy
populated by those who have already completed it.
Yet, recent trends in literary criticism have begun to call
into question the transcendental nature of rigid binary pairs, many
of which are located in the reading and interpretation of cultural
texts. Roland Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” fixes as the
object of his criticism the binarism of “authorized” and
“unauthorized” interpretation of a text, connecting “authorized”
readings with the sanctified personality of the “Author-God.” He
explains:
To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to
furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. . . . In
the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be disentangled,
nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, ‘run’
(like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every
level, but there is nothing beneath: the space of writing is to
be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly posits
meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a
systematic exemption of meaning. 2
Rather than approaching our cultural texts in hopes of
“deciphering” fixed meanings, we are then compelled to view what
we are researching as a “multi-dimensional space in which a
variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.” What
does this have to say to the Student-Scholar distinction? It
compels us to move towards the realization that the preferencing of
“authorized” Scholarly readings over “unauthorized” Student ones
emerges out of the distinction between the processes which
authorized who is permitted to “produce” knowledge and who is
forced to “consume” it, disregarding the majority of readings,
interpretations, interactions, intersections, denials, refusals,
affirmations, inspirations, and discoveries that occur during these
moments of “unauthorized” Student readings. The move away
from an understanding of the “work” as singular, monolithic, and
2
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coherent towards the valuation of the subjectivity of the reader and
his or her multiple points of view threatens the clarity and stability
of the Student-Scholar distinction if the “authorized,”
“legitimized,” “mature” scholarly readings turn out to be only one
voice in the polyphony of possible readings. Thus, the
decentralization and deauthorization of knowledge from the
academy commemorates the “Death of the Scholar” and the “Birth
of the Student,” and it is in this movement away from the ScholarGod unlocking the meanings of texts that the variety of readings
that texts sustain necessitates the creation of a colloquium
dedicated to Student-Scholarship, a conference where StudentScholars are permitted to explore their own subjectivities,
suspended in a particular historical, cultural, and linguistic
moment.
This brings me to my second question – what does it mean
to be a Student of the Foreign? Perhaps, it would be better to first
ask, can one be a Scholar of the Foreign? This undoubtedly
sounds strange, for someone calling themselves a Scholar of the
Foreign makes a claim of authority over that which is
epistemologically not their own. A Scholar of a foreign culture
does not possess a native’s knowledge, language, customs, or
culture, and consequently is an intruder, an interloper, claiming a
position of authority and privilege that may fundamentally differ
from the perspectives generated from within the culture. We can
easily put the Foreigner-Native opposition along the same axis as
we have with the Student-Scholar. Taking America, for example, I
as a native in the old view would have privileged positions,
perspectives, and knowledge of American culture, authorized
primarily by the fact that I was born in the United States, possess
an insider’s knowledge of its language, history, customs, and
culture, and myself actively participate in and prolong its traditions
and cultural processes. In comparison with my readings of
American life, the interpretations generated beyond the country’s
borders would then be unauthorized until having undergone the
American right of passage of being a citizens, thus, making the
transition from possessing outsider’s to insider’s knowledge.
If we put this Foreign-Native paradigm under the same
scrutiny, however, one immediately comes to realize that the
reason why all of us are here today is because one of the most
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valuable routes to achieving higher levels of understanding about
our own cultures and the foreign ones that we study is intimately
connected to searching out, collecting, and evaluating as many
possible readings of our respective cultures as possible, or put
differently, seeing ourselves from a Foreign Point of View. We
can see that those of us who study the Foreign, research the
Foreign, and dive deep into the minutia of the Foreign that may
otherwise be overlooked by Natives – we generate the very
multiplicity of readings that the post-structuralist Student-Scholar
calls for, mindful that the identity of the texts we study is ever
unstable, shifting, and amorphous and – strangely – dependent
upon and constituted by us. The readings generated through
interactions with the foreign not only reconstitute, reconstrue, and
reenvision the text, but are in fact integral to its being.
So what I would like to propose, then, is that those of us
who study that which is not our own – that which is alien, strange,
different, or, simply, foreign – are constantly reminded of our
status as Students with a capital S, reminded that we are going to
be lifelong consumers of the knowledge of the other. We all
participated in these two conferences to meditate upon, call
attention to, and celebrate the intersections and divergences of
different cultures and what we have to teach each other. Each of
us simultaneously embodied the roles of Students and Scholars and
were transformed into Students of that which is our own. In other
words, the participants of both conferences collectively took the
first, crucial step towards an understanding of just exactly what it
means to be a Student of the Foreign
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